# 1NC

## Offcase

### Israel CP

#### Text: The United States Federal Government should require formal Congressional declaration prior to the introduction of United States armed forces into hostilities, unless to repel attacks on the United States or Israel.

#### Consistent statements in support of U.S. security assurances that the US will come to the defense of Israel if they are under attack are key to prevent Israeli lashout

Murdock 09, Sr Advisor CSIS

(Clark A.-, Jessica M. Yeats, Linton F. Brooks, M. Elaine Bunn, Franklin C. Miller, James L. Schoff, CSIS Workshop Proceeding and Key Takeaways, “Exploring the Nuclear Posture Implications of Extended Deterrence and Assurance”, <http://csis.org/files/publication/091218_nuclear_posture.pdf>)

U.S. security assurances to Israel probably have their greatest impact on Israel’s calculus on whether it should act preventively (as it did in the past against Iraq and Syria) against Iran. Former Israeli Deputy National Security Adviser Chuck Freilich argues that “Israel’s understanding of American strategy…would affect Israel’s determination to act unilaterally…[and] Israel’s willingness to discuss options for living with a nuclear Iran would be affected by a better appreciation of American strategy and of the deterrent options the United States would be willing to consider.” In whatever form they may take, U.S. statements and actions that strengthen Israel’s confidence in U.S. assurances, both in preventing Iran from acquiring nuclear weapons and coping with a nuclear Iran, will make it less likely that Israel will feel compelled to preemptively attack Iran’s nuclear facilities. Recent developments – particularly in missile defense cooperation – appear to be helping in this regard. In a stark change of tone, Israeli Defense Minister Eduh Barak was recently quoted saying, "Israel is strong and I do not see anyone capable of representing a threat to our existence…right now is the moment for diplomacy.”146 The Washington Post reported that this strength is derived from three parts: “its nuclear capabilities…the assumption that the United States would stand behind Israel if it came under attack…[and] the calculation that enough of the country’s air bases and military facilities would survive a first strike to retaliate effectively.”147

#### An Israeli strike collapses the global economy, heg, and sparks war with China and Russia

Reuveny 10, Public Affairs Professor at Indiana

(Rafael, Guest Opinion: Unilateral strike on Iran could trigger world depression, www.indiana.edu/~spea/news/speaking\_out/reuveny\_on\_unilateral\_strike\_Iran.shtml)

A unilateral Israeli strike on Iran’s nuclear facilities would likely have dire consequences, including a regional war, global economic collapse and a major power clash. For an Israeli campaign to succeed, it must be quick and decisive. This requires an attack that would be so overwhelming that Iran would not dare to respond in full force. Such an outcome is extremely unlikely since the locations of some of Iran’s nuclear facilities are not fully known and known facilities are buried deep underground. All of these widely spread facilities are shielded by elaborate air defense systems constructed not only by the Iranians, but also the Chinese and, likely, the Russians as well. By now, Iran has also built redundant command and control systems and nuclear facilities, developed early-warning systems, acquired ballistic and cruise missiles and upgraded and enlarged its armed forces. Because Iran is well-prepared, a single, conventional Israeli strike — or even numerous strikes — could not destroy all of its capabilities, giving Iran time to respond. A regional war Unlike Iraq, whose nuclear program Israel destroyed in 1981, Iran has a second-strike capability comprised of a coalition of Iranian, Syrian, Lebanese, Hezbollah, Hamas, and, perhaps, Turkish forces. Internal pressure might compel Jordan, Egypt, and the Palestinian Authority to join the assault, turning a bad situation into a regional war. During the 1973 Arab-Israeli War, at the apex of its power, Israel was saved from defeat by President Nixon’s shipment of weapons and planes. Today, Israel’s numerical inferiority is greater, and it faces more determined and better-equipped opponents. Despite Israel’s touted defense systems, Iranian coalition missiles, armed forces, and terrorist attacks would likely wreak havoc on its enemy, leading to a prolonged tit-for-tat. In the absence of massive U.S. assistance, Israel’s military resources may quickly dwindle, forcing it to use its alleged nuclear weapons, as it had reportedly almost done in 1973. An Israeli nuclear attack would likely destroy most of Iran’s capabilities, but a crippled Iran and its coalition could still attack neighboring oil facilities, unleash global terrorism, plant mines in the Persian Gulf and impair maritime trade in the Mediterranean, Red Sea and Indian Ocean. Middle Eastern oil shipments would likely slow to a trickle as production declines due to the war and insurance companies decide to drop their risky Middle Eastern clients. Iran and Venezuela would likely stop selling oil to the United States and Europe. The world economy would head into a tailspin; international acrimony would rise; and Iraqi and Afghani citizens might fully turn on the United States, immediately requiring the deployment of more American troops. Russia, China, Venezuela, and maybe Brazil and Turkey — all of which essentially support Iran — could be tempted to form an alliance and openly challenge the U.S. hegemony. Replaying Nixon’s nightmare Russia and China might rearm their injured Iranian protege overnight, just as Nixon rearmed Israel, and threaten to intervene, just as the U.S.S.R. threatened to join Egypt and Syria in 1973. President Obama’s response would likely put U.S. forces on nuclear alert, replaying Nixon’s nightmarish scenario. Iran may well feel duty-bound to respond to a unilateral attack by its Israeli archenemy, but it knows that it could not take on the United States head-to-head. In contrast, if the United States leads the attack, Iran’s response would likely be muted. If Iran chooses to absorb an American-led strike, its allies would likely protest and send weapons, but would probably not risk using force. While no one has a crystal ball, leaders should be risk-averse when choosing war as a foreign policy tool. If attacking Iran is deemed necessary, Israel must wait for an American green light. A unilateral Israeli strike could ultimately spark World War III.

### Politics

**The farm bill is Obama’s top priority it will pass**

**Dreiling, 11/15** (Larry, 11/15/2013, “Branches jockey for farm bill positions,” http://www.hpj.com/archives/2013/nov13/nov18/1112FarmBillLDsr.cfm))

**While the House-Senate farm bill discussions continue, the White House staked out its position** in an address in New Orleans.

**Senate Agriculture Committee Chairwoman** Debbie **Stabenow** signaled Nov. 5 that face-to-face talks among the top four farm bill negotiators will resume this week, and she **is upbeat enough to hope for a deal by Thanksgiving**.

“I hope so. **It’s doable**,” the Michigan Democrat said to the Capitol Hill publication Politico.

“I feel confident the four of us can come together,” Stabenow said, speaking of herself, Sen. Thad Cochran, R-MS; Rep. Collin Peterson, D-MN; and House Agriculture Committee Chairman Frank Lucas, R-OK.

While the House remained on recess through Veterans Day, Peterson’s office confirmed that he was flying back to Washington early in the week, and Stabenow told Politico that all four would meet.

“The savings of the farm bill will certainly be part of the solution to the budget,” said Stabenow, who is also part of those House-Senate negotiations. But she and Lucas have both said repeatedly that the text of any farm bill will be theirs to write.

“The issue is who writes the farm bill,” Stabenow said. “We’ll write the farm bill.”

For all her optimism, the chairwoman gave little ground herself on the contentious issue of savings on nutrition programs.

The Senate farm bill proposes about $4 billion in 10-year savings, compared with the $39 billion in reductions assumed in the revised nutrition title approved by the House in September. It’s a huge gap, but Stabenow insisted that negotiators can’t ignore previously enacted food stamp cuts that went into effect Nov. 1.

Those reductions will reduce spending by as much as $11 billion over the period used by the Congressional Budget Office to score the farm bill. Typically, these are not counted since the savings result from prior actions by Congress. But Stabenow said they cannot be ignored.

“I am counting them,” she told Politco. “That’s real and if (the House’s) objective is to cut help for people, that started last Friday. I do count that. In fairness, that needs to be counted.”

In the same vein, she showed no interest in a compromise narrowing the range of income and asset tests now used by states in judging eligibility for food stamps.

“At this point, what I’m interested in doing is focusing on fraud and abuse—ways to tighten up the system to make it more accountable,” she said. “I’m not interested in taking food away from folks who have had an economic disaster, just as I’m not interested in cutting crop insurance for farmers who have had economic disasters.”

Meanwhile, President Barack **Obama delivered a speech** at the Port of New Orleans Nov. 8, **saying that passing a farm bill is the No. 1 way that Democrats and Republicans can increase jobs in the economy**.

Helping American businesses grow, creating more jobs—these are not Democratic or Republican priorities, Obama said.

“They are priorities that everybody, regardless of party, should be able to get behind. And that’s why, in addition to working with Congress to grow our exports, I’ve put forward additional ideas where I believe Democrats and Republicans can join together to make progress right now,” Obama said.

That’s when **Obama launched into his pitch on the farm bill**.

**“Congress needs to pass a farm bill that helps rural communities grow and protects vulnerable Americans,”** Obama said. “For decades, Congress found a way to compromise and pass farm bills without fuss. For some reason, now Congress can’t even get that done.

“Now, this is not something that just benefits farmers. Ports like this one depend on all the products coming down the Mississippi. So let’s do the right thing, pass a farm bill. We can start selling more products. That’s more business for this port. And that means more jobs right here.”

**Obama listed immigration reform and a responsible budget as his second and third priorities.**

**Obama’s involvement is key to a SNAP deal --- that’s the biggest sticking point**

**Hagstrom, 11/3** --- founder and executive editor of The Hagstrom Report (11/3/2013, Jerry, “Compromise Is the Key to a New Farm Bill; It is time for House and Senate conferees to stop listening to the lobbyists and finish the bill,” <http://www.nationaljournal.com/outside-influences/compromise-is-the-key-to-a-new-farm-bill-20131103>))

"Can we do it? Can we still compromise?" a prominent agricultural lobbyist who has worked on several farm bills asked last week as the House and Senate conference committee on the next farm bill was about to meet for the first time.

It was a good question because the bill's overlong development period has given all the interests so many opportunities to state their positions that they seem more dug in than in past bill-writing efforts. But **at the conference last week there were signals that the conferees think the time to act has come**.

The 41 conferees did use the last and possibly only public opportunity to make the case for their views. But almost all the members abided by the directive from the conference leader, House Agriculture Committee Chairman Frank Lucas, R-Okla., to keep their remarks to three minutes. And even the most ideological of them on the right and left were polite and stressed that they were there to compromise and finish a bill.

It's unclear how quickly the conferees will proceed to the big issues because the House has left town until Nov. 12, the day after Veterans Day. There has been talk of a meeting on the bill between President Obama and the four conference committee principals—Lucas, House Agriculture ranking member Collin Peterson, D-Minn., Senate Agriculture Chairwoman Debbie Stabenow, D-Mich., and Senate Agriculture ranking member Thad Cochran, R-Miss. Peterson said he has mixed feelings about such a meeting because support from Obama might cause some House members to oppose the bill.

But **Peterson noted that the "one place" on which Obama could be "helpful" would be resolving the size of the cut to food stamps, formally known as** the **S**upplemental **N**utrition **A**ssistance **P**rogram. **Lucas has said that it is likely to be the last item settled and that Obama**, House Speaker John **Boehner**, R-Ohio, **and** Senate Majority Leader Harry **Reid**, D-Nev., **will have to make the call on that**. The official White House position on food stamps is to make no cuts, while the Senate-passed farm bill would cut the program by $4 billion over 10 years and the House-passed bill would cut it by $39 billion over the same period.

**The plan de-rails the agenda**

**Kriner, 10** --- assistant professor of political science at Boston University

(Douglas L. Kriner, “After the Rubicon: Congress, Presidents, and the Politics of Waging War”, University of Chicago Press, Dec 1, 2010, page 68-69)

**While congressional support leaves the president’s reserve of political capital intact, congressional criticism saps energy from other initiatives on the home front by forcing the president to expend energy and effort defending his international agenda. Political capital spent shoring up support for a president’s foreign policies is capital that is unavailable for his future policy initiatives**. Moreover, any weakening in the president’s political clout may have immediate ramifications for his reelection prospects, as well as indirect consequences for congressional races.59 Indeed, Democratic efforts to tie congressional Republican incumbents to President George W. Bush and his war policies paid immediate political dividends in the 2006 midterms, particularly in states, districts, and counties that had suffered the highest casualty rates in the Iraq War. 60

**In addition to boding ill for the president’s perceived political capital and reputation, such partisan losses in Congress only further imperil his programmatic agenda, both international and domestic.** Scholars have long noted that President Lyndon **Johnson’s dream of a Great Society also perished in the rice paddies of Vietnam. Lacking** the requisite funds in a war-depleted treasury and **the political capital needed to sustain his legislative vision, Johnson gradually let his domestic goals slip away** as he hunkered down in an effort first to win and then to end the Vietnam War. In the same way, **many of** President **Bush’s highest second-term domestic proprieties, such as Social Security and immigration reform, failed perhaps in large part because the administration had to expend so much energy and effort waging a rear-guard action against congressional critics of the war in Iraq.**61

**When making their cost-benefit calculations, presidents surely consider these wider political costs of congressional opposition to their military policies.** If congressional opposition in the military arena stands to derail other elements of his agenda, all else being equal, the president will be more likely to judge the benefits of military action insufficient to its costs than if Congress stood behind him in the international arena.

**SNAP is the main barrier --- farm bill’s key to ag and the economy**

**Denver Post, 11/10** (The Post Editorials, 11/10/2013, “Here's why the farm bill matters,” Factiva))

The farm bill has the rap of being a public policy snooze, a broad measure that gets boiled down to a debate over subsidies to wealthy farmers and food stamp handouts to the poor.

Agriculture Secretary Tom Vilsack reminded the Denver Post editorial board last week that it's important to see beyond those flashpoints. **In Colorado**, for example, **the bill has vital implications for agricultural production, conservation and struggling rural economies**.

Vilsack is right, of course, but it's also true that **trench warfare over food assistance is the major point of disagreement between GOP and Democratic lawmakers**, who will meet this week in committee to seek compromise.

**They need to find consensus, and it shouldn't be that hard.**

Although the Supplemental Nutrition Assistance Program (SNAP) is a crucial safety net, there are ways to trim it back somewhat more than the $4 billion over 10 years that Democrats have proposed.

Slicing SNAP by $39 billion, however, which some Republicans seek, is both unfair and unrealistic.

One area ripe for reform involves tightening standards for states that waive work requirement rules for able-bodied adults.

There are circumstances in which a waiver is justified, in an economy where there are few jobs to be found. As Vilsack told us, when a plant closes in a small town and 1,000 people lose work, it may be unrealistic to expect those people to find jobs.

But waivers shouldn't go on forever if the economy improves, and tightening the rules could result in savings.

Republicans have been alarmed by the growth of food assistance spending in recent years. But that trend isn't likely to be permanent even with the present law. While the Congressional Budget Office projects small increases in SNAP recipients through 2014, that number will then decline as the economy improves.

A steady course that includes continued support for the needy and moderate cuts to slow government spending should be the goal.

**Reaching consensus on the food assistance piece will allow the other initiatives in the farm bill to go forward, including partnerships to create marketable products from beetle-killed trees and job development in rural areas.**

**The farm bill** may not be the sexiest piece of legislation, but it **works in important ways to secure the nation's food supply, protect the health of federal forests and strengthen rural economies.** Federal lawmakers need to move off their entrenched positions and pass the legislation.

**Farm bill critical U.S. economic stability --- sustains a vital sector**

**Johanns, 11/12** --- Senator from Nebraska who sits on the Agriculture, Nutrition and Forestry; the Banking, Housing and Urban Affairs committee (Sen. Mike Johanns, “Bill can be part of budget solution,” <http://thehill.com/homenews/news/190046-bill-can-be-part-of-budget-solution>))

But the farm bill is much more than a tool for budget hawks in Washington to achieve savings. **Fresh agriculture policy has proven elusive for those who feed and fuel our world since the old policy expired last year. Recent droughts and freak blizzards underscore the need for replenished disaster assistance that expired in 2011.**

Farmers and ranchers from my home state of Nebraska tell me they could live without costly annual direct payments to bolster their income, and they are happy to pay into a crop insurance program that provides a backstop in tough years. They are prepared to do their part to help reduce government spending so long as they have the risk management tools they need to succeed. Lawmakers must also be prepared to provide these tools while reducing government spending.

Eliminating direct payments and streamlining duplicative conservation programs are part of the agriculture titles that save about $13 billion in both chambers’ farm bills. While lawmakers might differ on how additional cost savings are achieved, the end product will reflect improved efficiency and a commitment to targeting government resources more narrowly to meet specific needs.

**The food stamp program is the biggest sticking point in farm bill negotiations.** The Senate bill saves $4 billion from the Supplemental Nutrition Assistance Program (SNAP), or about one-half of a percent. The House bill saves about 10 times more. Admittedly, there’s a lot of pasture between those two figures. And both sides should be prepared to live with something in the middle.

As these negotiations move forward, we must acknowledge that we are working with a limited pot of resources, requiring a strong commitment to efficiency and priority. Nobody wants to block assistance from folks truly in need, and we should seek ways to protect limited resources for these families. One way to do this is to crack down on states that skirt eligibility requirements for SNAP recipients by enrolling folks in the program who don’t qualify for the benefit. Doing so would save roughly $20 billion and ensure limited resources are not being diluted by state programs that lure unqualified Americans into unneeded federal benefits.

**The farm bill is not out of the woods yet, but it stands as a model for fiscally responsible governance. The bipartisan, multiregional, multifaceted House and Senate plans focus on how to save rather than how to spend. A new long-term farm bill would provide certainty for the rural sector that is so important for economic stability.** It guarantees real savings while protecting vulnerable families. And **it might be just the example Congress needs to inspire responsible solutions to the fiscal challenges facing our nation.**

**So does ag collapse**

**Klare 12** -- Hampshire College security studies professor

[Michael, defense correspondent of The Nation magazine, serves on the boards of directors of Human Rights Watch, and the Arms Control Association, “As Food Prices Rise, Dangers of Social Unrest Seem Imminent,” August 9]

The Great Drought of 2012 has yet to come to an end, but we already know that its **consequences will be severe. With more than one-half of America’s counties designated as drought disaster areas, the 2012 harvest of corn, soybeans, and other food staples is guaranteed to fall far short of predictions. This, in turn, will boost food prices domestically and abroad, causing increased misery for farmers and low-income Americans and far greater hardship for poor people in countries that rely on imported U.S. grains. This, however, is just the beginning of the likely consequences: If history is any guide, rising food prices of this sort will also lead to widespread social unrest and violent conflict. Food—affordable food—is essential to human survival and well-being. Take that away, and people become anxious, desperate, and angry**. In the United States, food represents only about 13 percent of the average household budget, a relatively small share, so a boost in food prices in 2013 will probably not prove overly taxing for most middle—and upper-income families. It could, however, produce considerable hardship for poor and unemployed Americans with limited resources. “You are talking about a real bite out of family budgets,” commented Ernie Gross, an agricultural economist at Omaha’s Creighton University. This could add to the discontent already evident in depressed and high-unemployment areas, perhaps prompting an intensified backlash against incumbent politicians and other forms of dissent and unrest. It is in the international arena, however, that the Great Drought is likely to have its most devastating effects. Because so **many nations depend on grain imports from the U.S**. to supplement their own harvests, and because intense drought and floods are damaging crops elsewhere as well, food supplies are expected to shrink and prices to rise across the planet. “What happens to the U.S. supply has immense impact around the world,” says Robert Thompson, a food expert at the Chicago Council on Global Affairs. As the crops most affected by the drought, corn and soybeans, disappear from world markets, he noted, the price of all grains, including wheat, is likely to soar, causing immense hardship to those who already have trouble affording enough food to feed their families. The Hunger Games, 2007-2011 What happens next is, of course, impossible to predict, but if the recent past is any guide, it could turn ugly. In 2007-2008, when rice, corn, and wheat experienced prices hikes of 100 percent or more, sharply higher prices—especially for bread—sparked “food riots” in more than two dozen countries, including Bangladesh, Cameroon, Egypt, Haiti, Indonesia, Senegal, and Yemen. In Haiti, the rioting became so violent and public confidence in the government’s ability to address the problem dropped so precipitously that the Haitian Senate voted to oust the country’s prime minister, Jacques-Édouard Alexis. In other countries, angry protestors clashed with army and police forces, leaving scores dead. Those price increases of 2007-2008 were largely attributed to the soaring cost of oil, which made food production more expensive. (Oil’s use is widespread in farming operations, irrigation, food delivery, and pesticide manufacture.) At the same time, increasing amounts of cropland worldwide were being diverted from food crops to the cultivation of plants used in making biofuels. The next price spike in 2010-11 was, however, closely associated with climate change. An intense drought gripped much of eastern Russia during the summer of 2010, reducing the wheat harvest in that breadbasket region by one-fifth and prompting Moscow to ban all wheat exports. Drought also hurt China’s grain harvest, while intense flooding destroyed much of Australia’s **wheat crop. Together with other extreme-weather-related effects, these disasters sent wheat prices soaring by more than 50 percent and the price of most food staples by 32 percent. Once again, a surge in food prices resulted in widespread social unrest, this time concentrated in North Africa and the Middle East. The earliest protests arose over the cost of staples in Algeria and then Tunisia, where—no coincidence—the precipitating event was a young food vendor, Mohamed Bouazizi, setting himself on fire to protest government harassment. Anger over rising food and fuel prices combined with long-simmering resentments about government repression and corruption sparked what became known as the Arab Spring. The rising cost of basic staples, especially a loaf of bread, was also a cause of unrest in Egypt, Jordan, and Sudan. Other factors, notably anger at entrenched autocratic regimes, may have proved more powerful in those places, but as the author of Tropic of Chaos, Christian Parenti, wrote, “The initial trouble was traceable, at least in part, to the price of that loaf of bread.” As for the current drought, analysts are already warning of instability in Africa, where corn is a major staple, and of increased popular unrest in China, where food prices are expected to rise at a time of growing hardship for that country’s vast pool of low-income, migratory workers and poor peasants. Higher food prices in the U.S. and China could also lead to reduced consumer spending on other goods, further contributing to the slowdown in the global economy and producing yet more worldwide misery, with unpredictable social consequences.** The Hunger Games, 2012-? If this was just one bad harvest, occurring in only one country, the world would undoubtedly absorb the ensuing hardship and expect to bounce back in the years to come. Unfortunately, it’s becoming evident that the Great Drought of 2012 is not a one-off event in a single heartland nation, but rather an inevitable consequence of global warming which is only going to intensify. As a result, we can expect not just more bad years of extreme heat, but worse years, hotter and more often, and not just in the United States, but globally for the indefinite future. Until recently, most scientists were reluctant to blame particular storms or droughts on global warming. Now, however, a growing number of scientists believe that such links can be demonstrated in certain cases. In one recent study focused on extreme weather events in 2011, for instance, climate specialists at the National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration (NOAA) and Great Britain’s National Weather Service concluded that human-induced climate change has made intense heat waves of the kind experienced in Texas in 2011 more likely than ever before. Published in the Bulletin of the American Meteorological Society, it reported that global warming had ensured that the incidence of that Texas heat wave was 20 times more likely than it would have been in 1960; similarly, abnormally warm temperatures like those experienced in Britain last November were said to be 62 times as likely because of global warming. It is still too early to apply the methodology used by these scientists to calculating the effect of global warming on the heat waves of 2012, which are proving to be far more severe, but we can assume the level of correlation will be high. And what can we expect in the future, as the warming gains momentum? When we think about climate change (if we think about it at all), we envision rising temperatures, prolonged droughts, freakish storms, hellish wildfires, and rising sea levels. Among other things, this will result in damaged infrastructure and diminished food supplies. These are, of course, manifestations of warming in the physical world, not the social world we all inhabit and rely on for so many aspects of our daily well-being and survival. The purely physical effects of climate change will, no doubt, prove catastrophic. But the social effects including, somewhere down the line, food riots, mass starvation, state collapse, mass migrations, and conflicts of every sort, up to and including full-scale war, could prove even more disruptive and deadly. In her immensely successful young-adult novel, The Hunger Games (and the movie that followed), Suzanne Collins riveted millions with a portrait of a dystopian, resource-scarce, post-apocalyptic future where once-rebellious “districts” in an impoverished North America must supply two teenagers each year for a series of televised gladiatorial games that end in death for all but one of the youthful contestants. These “hunger games” are intended as recompense for the damage inflicted on the victorious capitol of Panem by the rebellious districts during an insurrection. Without specifically mentioning global warming, Collins makes it clear that climate change was significantly responsible for the hunger that shadows the North American continent in this future era. Hence, as the gladiatorial contestants are about to be selected, the mayor of District 12’s principal city describes “the disasters, the droughts, the storms, the fires, the encroaching seas that swallowed up so much of the land [and] the brutal war for what little sustenance remained.” In this, Collins was prescient, even if her specific vision of the violence on which such a world might be organized is fantasy. While we may never see her version of those hunger games, do not doubt that some version of them will come into existence—that, in fact, **hunger wars of many sorts will fill our future**. These could include any combination or permutation of the deadly riots that led to the 2008 collapse of Haiti’s government, the pitched battles between massed protesters and security forces that engulfed parts of Cairo as the Arab Spring developed, the ethnic struggles over disputed croplands and water sources that have made Darfur a recurring headline of horror in our world, or the inequitable distribution of agricultural land that continues to fuel the insurgency of the Maoist-inspired Naxalites of India. Combine such conflicts with another likelihood: that persistent drought and hunger will force millions of people to abandon their traditional lands and flee to the squalor of shantytowns and expanding slums surrounding large cities, sparking hostility from those already living there. One such eruption, with grisly results, occurred in Johannesburg’s shantytowns in 2008 when desperately poor and hungry migrants from Malawi and Zimbabwe were set upon, beaten, and in some cases burned to death by poor South Africans. One terrified Zimbabwean, cowering in a police station from the raging mobs, said she fled her country because “there is no work and no food.” And **count on something else: millions more in the coming decades, pressed by disasters ranging from drought and flood to rising sea levels, will try to migrate to other countries, provoking even greater hostility. And that hardly begins to exhaust the possibilities that lie in our hunger-games future. At this point, the focus is understandably on the immediate consequences of the still ongoing Great Drought: dying crops, shrunken harvests, and rising food prices. But keep an eye out for the social and political effects that undoubtedly won’t begin to show up here or globally until later this year or 2013. Better than any academic study, these will offer us a hint of what we can expect in the coming decades from a hunger-games world of rising temperatures, persistent droughts, recurring food shortages, and billions of famished, desperate people.**

### XO CP

#### The President of the United States of America should seek the legal advice of the United States Department of Justice’s Office of Legal Counsel in the area of offensive use of military force. The OLC should publically disclose a written legal opinion that the executive branch of the United States federal government should not initiate offensive use of military force prior to receiving Congressional authorization and the President should issue an executive order complying with that advice. Other executive branch legal personnel, including the Attorney General, will defer to the advice of the OLC on this issue.

#### Internal administrative decisions solve – prevents the precedent of unilateral executive action from “taking root” in future administrations

Barron and Lederman – 1ac authors – 2008

David J. Barron\* and Martin S. Lederman\*\*, \* Professor of Law, Harvard Law School and \*\* Visiting Professor of Law, Georgetown University Law Center, ARTICLE: THE COMMANDER IN CHIEF AT THE LOWEST EBB -- A CONSTITUTIONAL HISTORY, February, 2008, 121 Harv. L. Rev. 941

Thus, as future administrations contemplate the extent of their own discretion at the "lowest ebb," they will be faced with an important choice. They can build upon a practice rooted in a fundamental acceptance of the legitimacy of congressional control over the conduct of campaigns that prevailed without substantial challenge through World War II. Or they can cast their lot with the more recent view, espoused to some extent by most - though not all - modern Presidents, that the principle of exclusive control over the conduct of war provides the baseline from which to begin thinking about the Commander in Chief's proper place in the constitutional structure. We conclude that it would be wrong to assume, as some have suggested, that the emergence of such preclusive claims will be self-defeating, inevitably inspiring a popular and legislative reaction that will leave the presidency especially weakened. The more substantial concern is the opposite one. The risk is that the emergence of such claims will subtly but increasingly influence future Executives to eschew the harder work of accepting legislative constraints as legitimate and actively working to make them tolerable by building public support for modifications. Over time, the prior practice we describe could well become at best a faintly remembered one, set aside on the ground that it is unsuited for what are thought to be the unique perils of the contemporary world. Our hope, therefore, is that by presenting this longstanding constitutional practice of congressional engagement and executive accommodation as a workable alternative, such forgetting will be far less likely to occur.

### North Korea DA

#### Korea is the most volatile hotspot in the world and risk of North Korean miscalc is high – US deterrence across the DMZ is key

MARTHA RADDATZ and LUIS MARTINEZ – 4/2/13, U.S. General Says North Korea Situation Is 'Volatile' and 'Dangerous', http://abcnews.go.com/International/us-general-north-korea-situation-volatile-dangerous/story?id=18863864&singlePage=true

Gen. James Thurman, the top U.S. commander in South Korea, said that in his two years on the job he has never seen things as tense as they are right now, telling ABC News the situation on the Korean peninsula is "volatile" and "dangerous." Thurman said in his exclusive interview with ABC News that his " job is to prevent war," but that his greatest fear is a "miscalculation" that causes "a kinetic provocation." In military parlance, kinetic refers to combat. Thurman said North Korea's recent rhetoric has made the situation on the Korean peninsula "a dangerous period," but he added, "I think we're managing it quite well because on this side of the line we're very calm. And we're confident." Thurman commands the 28,500 American military forces based in South Korea and also serves as the commander of United Nations Command. The interview was conducted in one of the buildings at Panmunjon along the Demilitarized Zone (DMZ) where South Korean and North Korean military forces face off just steps away from each other. Thurman believes the "tough talk" from Kim Jong Un, North Korea's young leader, is him "trying to play to his internal audience." However, Thurman said that more importantly Kim is also trying "to intimidate the South Koreans and intimidate the region And we're not going to let that happen." The general thinks South Korea is serious when it says it will respond militarily to any offensive action by North Korea. "I believe they will because we have a right to protect ourselves. And again we're not going to let the North Koreans intimidate us," said Thurman. Thurman said with the North Korean rhetoric at such a high level his greatest fear is "a miscalculation. An impulsive decision that causes a kinetic provocation." The general said he has to take North Korea's rhetoric seriously. Asked if he thought they were empty threats Thurman said "No, I don't think that they are. We've got to take every threat seriously." With so little known about Kim Jong Un, Thurman said he is not sure what his true intentions are :because he's kind of reckless right now with his talk and all that." North Korea's latest provocation came today when it announced that it was restarting the nuclear reactor at Yongbyon that it had closed down in 2007. The plant could be used to produce additional plutonium for its nuclear weapons program. While he described North Korea's missiles as their largest threat, Thurman pointed across the DMZ and noted "there's 14,000 tubes of artillery just across this line beyond that far mountain range over there." That artillery poses a direct threat to Seoul, the South Korean capital which is located just 27 miles from the DMZ. But if North Korea launches an offensive operation against South Korea Thurman said "I think we got to be ready to go." "We will defend ourselves. We don't want to respond to some type of deceptive move into a rapid escalation into a conflict ... My job is to prevent war." Thurman said the North Korean ballistic missile threat have the range to potentially hit the United States though "they haven't demonstrated the full capabilities that they can do an intercontinental ballistic missile as far as the delivery... I think they have a long way to go in my assessment." "I think as we look at the missile portfolio North Korea has, we protect the homeland number one and make sure all our assets are available so we can provide protection if necessary." Thurman would not discuss what those protection options might be though "everything is on the table." On Monday the U.S. Navy confirmed that it had sent the guided missile destroyer, USS John S McCain, to the waters off of South Korea. The ship carries SM-3 missiles capable of shooting down North Korean ballistic missiles. And today the Pentagon confirmed that an additional destroyer, the USS Decatur, was ordered to remain in the Pacific region. Thurman explained that the ships' movements, as well as the public acknowledgement that long range American bombers had conducted training missions over South Korea, were about sending a message of deterrence to North Korea. "Defending the Republic of Korea against aggression is all about deterrence. And I think we've got good deterrence," said Thurman. "I'm confident as the commander here in what we need to do should hostilities break out." While North Korea's rhetoric has raised tensions Thurman believes the situation will "calm down. I'm confident it will. I'm optimistic about it." He pointed to the practical reason that North Korea routinely uses its military to work the fields during the farming season "so that they can have a good harvest."

#### Changes in US defense commitments below the nuclear threshold collapse extended deterrence in Korea

Linton Brooks and Mira Rapp-Hooper - Oct 2013, Extended Deterrence, Assurance, and Reassurance in the Pacific during the Second Nuclear Age, Brooks = badass, former nuclear sub commander, and nonresident senior adviser at CSIS, http://www.nbr.org/publications/element.aspx?id=706#.Uoi1Mfl1ySo

The need to simultaneously deter China and North Korea, assure multiple allies, and reassure China, combined with regional nuclear dynamics, makes extended deterrence more complex now than during the Cold War. Particularly challenging is deterring low-level confrontations in the maritime sphere and, in the future, the cyber domain. The Asia-Pacific region is subject to a “security trilemma,” where U.S. actions to deter North Korea can have negative consequences for U.S. and allied security relations with China, making both assurance and reassurance much more difficult. Japan and South Korea have unique assurance requirements and need separate consideration. Reassuring China is particularly important but particularly difficult. Policy Implications Because both China and U.S. allies (especially Japan) are concerned about extended-deterrence commitments below the nuclear threshold, the U.S. should review the management of those commitments and use the results of that review to expand dialogue with allies and China. Because assuring its allies is inherently difficult, the U.S. should continue extensive consultations on extended deterrence, especially with Japan and South Korea, should make no major changes in declaratory policy on nuclear use, and should maintain rough strategic nuclear parity with Russia to avoid allied perceptions of U.S. inferiority. Because China believes the U.S. seeks to deny it an effective deterrent, U.S. leaders should reassure China by privately conveying Washington’s acceptance of mutual vulnerability as a fact of life and by working to implement modest confidence-building measures.

#### Extinction

Hayes & Hamel-Green, 10 – \*Executive Director of the Nautilus Institute for Security and Sustainable Development, AND \*\* Executive Dean of the Faculty of Arts, Education and Human Development act Victoria University (1/5/10, Executive Dean at Victoria, “The Path Not Taken, the Way Still Open: Denuclearizing the Korean Peninsula and Northeast Asia,” <http://www.nautilus.org/fora/security/10001HayesHamalGreen.pdf>)

The international community is increasingly aware that cooperative diplomacy is the most productive way to tackle the multiple, interconnected global challenges facing humanity, not least of which is the increasing proliferation of nuclear and other weapons of mass destruction. Korea and Northeast Asia are instances where risks of nuclear proliferation and actual nuclear use arguably have increased in recent years. This negative trend is a product of continued US nuclear threat projection against the DPRK as part of a general program of coercive diplomacy in this region, North Korea’s nuclear weapons programme, the breakdown in the Chinese-hosted Six Party Talks towards the end of the Bush Administration, regional concerns over China’s increasing military power, and concerns within some quarters in regional states (Japan, South Korea, Taiwan) about whether US extended deterrence (“nuclear umbrella”) afforded under bilateral security treaties can be relied upon for protection. The consequences of failing to address the proliferation threat posed by the North Korea developments, and related political and economic issues, are serious, not only for the Northeast Asian region but for the whole international community. At worst, there is the **possibility of nuclear attack**1, whether by **intention, miscalculation, or merely accident**, leading to the resumption of Korean War hostilities. On the Korean Peninsula itself, key population centres are well within short or medium range missiles. The whole of Japan is likely to come within North Korean missile range. Pyongyang has a population of over 2 million, Seoul (close to the North Korean border) 11 million, and Tokyo over 20 million. **Even a limited nuclear exchange would result in a holocaust of unprecedented proportions.** But the catastrophe within the region would not be the only outcome. New research indicates that even a limited nuclear war in the region would rearrange our global climate far more quickly than global warming. Westberg draws attention to new studies modelling the effects of even a limited nuclear exchange involving approximately 100 Hiroshima-sized 15 kt bombs2 (by comparison it should be noted that the United States currently deploys warheads in the range 100 to 477 kt, that is, individual warheads equivalent in yield to a range of 6 to 32 Hiroshimas).The studies indicate that the soot from the fires produced would lead to a decrease in global temperature by 1.25 degrees Celsius for a period of 6-8 years.3 In Westberg’s view: That is not global winter, but the nuclear darkness will cause a deeper drop in temperature than at any time during the last 1000 years. The temperature over the continents would decrease substantially more than the global average. A decrease in rainfall over the continents would also follow…The period of nuclear darkness will cause much greater decrease in grain production than 5% and it will continue for many years...hundreds of millions of people will die from hunger…To make matters even worse, such amounts of smoke injected into the stratosphere would cause a huge reduction in the Earth’s protective ozone.4 These, of course, are not the only consequences. Reactors might also be targeted, causing further mayhem and downwind radiation effects, superimposed on a smoking, radiating ruin left by nuclear next-use. Millions of refugees would flee the affected regions. The direct impacts, and the follow-on impacts on the global economy via ecological and food insecurity, could **make the present global financial crisis pale by comparison**. How the great powers, especially the nuclear weapons states respond to such a crisis, and in particular, whether nuclear weapons are used in response to nuclear first-use, could make or break the global non proliferation and disarmament regimes. There could be many unanticipated impacts on regional and global security relationships5, with **subsequent nuclear breakout** and geopolitical turbulence, including possible loss-of-control over fissile material or warheads in the chaos of nuclear war, and **aftermath chain-reaction affects involving other potential proliferant states.** The Korean nuclear proliferation issue is not just a regional threat but a global one that warrants priority consideration from the international community.

### Militarism K

#### **asking how the executive should be allowed to conduct war masks the fundamental question of whether war should be allowed at all – ensures a military mentality**

* Accepting that war is inevitable even without realizing it is problematic

Cady 10 (Duane L., prof of phil @ hamline university, From Warism to Pacifism: A Moral Continuum, pp. 22-23)

The widespread, unquestioning acceptance of warism and the corresponding reluctance to consider pacifism as a legitimate option make it difficult to propose a genuine consideration of pacifist alternatives. Warism may be held implicitly or explicitly. Held in its implicit form, it does not occur to the warist to challenge the view that war is morally justified; war is taken to be natural and normal. No other way of understanding large-scale human conflict even comes to mind. In this sense warism is like racism, sexism, and homophobia: a prejudicial bias built into conceptions and judgments without the awareness of those assuming it. In its explicit form, warism is openly accepted, articulated, and deliberately chosen as a value judgment on nations in conflict. War may be defended as essential for justice, needed for national security, as “the only thing the enemy understands,” and so on. In both forms warism misguides judgments and institutions by reinforcing the necessity and inevitability of war and precluding alternatives. Whether held implicitly or explicitly, warism obstructs questioning the conceptual framework of the culture. If we assume (without realizing it) that war itself is morally justifiable, our moral considerations of war will be focused on whether a particular war is justified or whether particular acts within a given war are morally acceptable. These are important concerns, but addressing them does not get at the fundamental issue raised by the pacifist: the morality of war as such. In Just and Unjust Wars Michael Walzer explains that “war is always judged twice, first with reference to the reasons states have for fighting, secondly with reference to the means they adopt.”8 The pacifist suggestion is that there is a third judgment of war that must be made prior to the other two: might war, by its very nature, be morally wrong? This issue is considered by Walzer only as an afterthought in an appendix, where it is dismissed as naïve. Perhaps Walzer should not be faulted for this omission, since he defines his task as describing the conventional morality of war and, as has been argued above, conventional morality does take warism for granted. To this extent Walzer is correct. And this is just the point: our warist conceptual frameworks— our warist normative lenses— blind us to the root question. The concern of pacifists is to expose the hidden warist bias and not merely describe cultural values. Pacifists seek to examine cultural values and recommend what they ought to be. This is why the pacifist insists on judging war in itself, a judgment more fundamental than the more limited assessments of the morality of a given war or the morality of specific acts within a particular war.

#### this mindset is important – our consciousness of war guarantees endless violence that ensures planetary destruction and structural violence

* Another impact: freeing ourselves from war = more resources for peace

Lawrence 9 (Grant, “Military Industrial "War" Consciousness Responsible for Economic and Social Collapse,” OEN—OpEdNews, March 27)

As a presidential candidate, [Barack Obama](http://obama.senate.gov/) called [Afghanistan](http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/War_in_Afghanistan_%282001%E2%80%93present%29) ''the war we must win.'' He was absolutely right. Now it is time to win it... Senators [John McCain](http://www.imdb.com/name/nm0564587/) and Joseph Lieberman [calling](http://www.miamiherald.com/opinion/inbox/story/960269.html) for an expanded war in Afghanistan "How true it is that war can destroy everything of value." Pope Benedict XVI [decrying](http://www.google.com/hostednews/afp/article/ALeqM5iuue8kE-e0lYZVFpt4RlbX4M_IEw) the suffering of Africa Where troops have been quartered, brambles and thorns spring up. In the track of great armies there must follow lean years. Lao Tzu on [War](http://www.sacred-texts.com/tao/salt/salt09.htm) As Americans we are raised on the utility of war to conquer every problem. We have a drug problem so we wage war on it. We have a cancer problem so we wage war on it. We have a crime problem so we wage war on it. Poverty cannot be dealt with but it has to be warred against. Terror is another problem that must be warred against. In the [United States](http://maps.google.com/maps?ll=38.8833333333,-77.0166666667&spn=10.0,10.0&q=38.8833333333,-77.0166666667%20%28United%20States%29&t=h), solutions can only be found in terms of wars. In a society that functions to support a massive military industrial war machine and empire, it is important that the terms promoted support the conditioning of its citizens. We are conditioned to see war as the solution to major social ills and major political disagreements. That way when we see so much of our resources devoted to war then we don't question the utility of it. The term "war" excites mind and body and creates a fear mentality that looks at life in terms of attack. In war, there has to be an attack and a must win attitude to carry us to victory. But is this war mentality working for us? In an age when nearly half of our tax money goes to support the war machine and a good deal of the rest is going to support the elite that control the war machine, we can see that our present war mentality is not working. Our values have been so perverted by our war mentality that we see sex as sinful but killing as entertainment. Our society is dripping violence. The violence is fed by poverty, social injustice, the break down of family and community that also arises from economic injustice, and by the managed media. The cycle of violence that exists in our society exists because it is useful to those that control society. It is easier to sell the war machine when your population is conditioned to violence. Our military industrial consciousness may not be working for nearly all of the life of the planet but it does work for the very few that are the master manipulators of our values and our consciousness. Rupert Murdoch, the media monopoly man that runs the "Fair and Balanced" [Fox Network](http://www.fox.com/), Sky Television, and [News Corp](http://www.newscorp.com/) just to name a few, [had](http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Rupert_Murdoch) all of his 175 newspapers editorialize in favor of the [Iraq war](http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Iraq_War). Murdoch snickers when [he says](http://www.newscorpse.com/ncWP/?p=341) "we tried" to manipulate public opinion." The Iraq war was a good war to Murdoch [because,](http://www.americanprogress.org/issues/2004/07/b122948.html) "The death toll, certainly of Americans there, by the terms of any previous war are quite minute." But, to the media manipulators, the phony politicos, the military industrial elite, a million dead Iraqis are not to be considered. War is big business and it is supported by a war consciousness that allows it to prosper. That is why more war in Afghanistan, the war on Palestinians, and the other wars around the planet in which the [military industrial complex](http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Military-industrial_complex) builds massive wealth and power will continue. The military industrial war mentality is not only killing, maiming, and destroying but it is also contributing to the present social and economic collapse. As mentioned previously, the massive wealth transfer that occurs when the American people give half of their money to support death and destruction is money that could have gone to support a just society. It is no accident that after years of war and preparing for war, our society is crumbling. Science and technological resources along with economic and natural resources have been squandered in the never-ending pursuit of enemies. All of that energy could have been utilized for the good of humanity, ¶ instead of maintaining the power positions of the very few super wealthy. So the suffering that we give is ultimately the suffering we get. Humans want to believe that they can escape the consciousness that they live in. But that consciousness determines what we experience and how we live. As long as we choose to live in "War" in our minds then we will continue to get "War" in our lives. When humanity chooses to wage peace on the world then there will be a flowering of life. But until then we will be forced to live the life our present war consciousness is creating.

#### The alternative must begin in our minds – we need to free ourselves of the presumption towards war and advocate for peace and social justice to stop the flow of militarism that threatens existence

* Democracy itself is the product of searching for peaceful solutions

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Where, then, does the future lie? Unilateralism, hegemonic political anarchy, mass immiseration, ecocide, and global violence—a Hobbesian bellum omnium contra omnes? Or international cooperation, social justice, and genuine collective—political and human—security? Down which path lies cowering, fragile hope?¶ Humanistic thinkers approach these problems from the perspective of their concern about the situation of individuals and the long-range interests of humanity. They examine in depth the root causes of these problems, warning about the consequences of escalation and, at the same time, indicating the prospect of their possible solutions through nonviolent means and a growing global consciousness. Today's world is in desperate need of realistic alternatives to violent conflict. Nonviolent action—properly planned and executed—is a powerful and effective force for political and social change. The ideas of peace and nonviolence, as expressed by Immanuel Kant, Leo Tolstoy, Mahatma Gandhi, Martin Luther King, and many contemporary philosophers—supported by peace and civil rights movements—counter the paralyzing fear with hope and offer a realistic alternative: a rational approach to the solutions to the problems, encouraging people to be the masters of their own destiny.¶ Fortunately, the memory of the tragedies of war and the growing realization of this new existential situation of humanity has awakened the global conscience and generated protest movements demanding necessary changes. During the four decades of the Cold War, which polarized the world, power politics was challenged by the common perspective of humanity, of the supreme value of human life, and the ethics of peace. Thus, in Europe, which suffered from both world wars and totalitarianism, spiritual-intellectual efforts to find solutions to these problems generated ideas of "new thinking," aiming for peace, freedom, and democracy. Today, philosophers, intellectuals, progressive political leaders, and peace-movement activists continue to promote a peaceful alternative. In the asymmetry of power, despite being frustrated by war-prone politics, peaceful projects emerge each time, like a phoenix arising from the ashes, as the only viable alternative for the survival of humanity. The new thinking in philosophy affirms the supreme value of human and nonhuman life, freedom, justice, and the future of human civilization. It asserts that the transcendental task of the survival of humankind and the rest of the biotic community must have an unquestionable primacy in comparison to particular interests of nations, social classes, and so forth. In applying these principles to the nuclear age, it considers a just and lasting peace as a categorical imperative for the survival of humankind, and thus proposes a world free from nuclear weapons and from war and organized violence.44 In tune with the Charter of the United Nations, it calls for the democratization of international relations and for dialogue and cooperation in order to secure peace, human rights, and solutions to global problems. It further calls for the transition toward a cosmopolitan order.¶ The escalating global problems are symptoms of what might be termed a contemporary civilizational disease, developed over the course of centuries, in which techno-economic progress is achieved at the cost of depersonalization and dehumanization. Therefore, the possibility of an effective "treatment" today depends on whether or not humankind will be able to regain its humanity, thus establishing new relations of the individual with himself or herself, with others, and with nature. Hence the need for a new philosophy of humanity and an ethics of nonviolence and planetary co-responsibility to help us make sense not only of our past historical events, but also of the extent, quality, and urgency of our present choices.

## Case

### Warfighting

#### Presidents have political incentives to cooperate with Congress over offensive operations – but requiring cooperation sends a signal of weakness to adversaries and hamstrings power projection

Michael A. Newton – 2012, Professor of the Practice of Law, Vanderbilt University Law School

Inadvertent Implications of the War Powers Resolution, Case Western Reserve Journal of International Law, vol 45, Fall 2012, [http://law.case.edu/journals/JIL/Documents/45CaseWResJIntlL1&2.10.Article.Newton.pdf](http://law.case.edu/journals/JIL/Documents/45CaseWResJIntlL1%262.10.Article.Newton.pdf)

The corollary to this modern reality, and the second of three inadvertent implications of the Resolution, is that our enemies now focus on American political will as the Achilles heel of our vast capabilities. Prior to the War Powers Resolution, President Eisenhower understood that it was necessary to “seek the cooperation of the Congress. Only with that can we give the reassurance needed to deter aggression.”62 President Clinton understood the importance of clear communication with the Congress and the American people in order to sustain the political legitimacy that is a vital element of modern military operations. Justifying his bombing of targets in Sudan, he argued that the “risks from inaction, to America and the world, would be far greater than action, for that would embolden our enemies, leaving their ability and their willingness to strike us intact.” 63 In his letter to Congress “consistent with the War Powers Resolution,” the president reported that the strikes “were a necessary and proportionate response to the imminent threat of further terrorist attacks against U.S. personnel and facilities” and “were intended to prevent and deter additional attacks by a clearly identified terrorist threat.” 64 The following day, in a radio address to the nation, the president explained his decision to take military action, stating, “Our goals were to disrupt bin Laden’s terrorist network and destroy elements of its infrastructure in Afghanistan and Sudan. And our goal was to destroy, in Sudan, the factory with which bin Laden’s network is associated, which was producing an ingredient essential for nerve gas.” 65 Citing “compelling evidence that the bin Laden network was poised to strike at us again” and was seeking to acquire chemical weapons, the president declared that we simply could not ignore the threat posed, and hence ordered the strikes.66 Similarly, President Clinton understood that intervention in Bosnia could not be successful absent some national consensus, which had been slow to form during the long Bosnian civil war.67 Secretary of State George Schultz provided perhaps the most poignant and pointed example of this truism in his testimony to Congress regarding the deployment of US Marines into Lebanon to separate the warring factions in 1982. On September 21, 1983, he testified before the Senate Foreign Relations Committee and provided a chilling premonition of the bombing that would come only one month later and kill 241 Americans, which was the bloodiest day in the Marine Corps since the battle of Iwo Jima.68 Seeking to bolster legislative support and to better explain the strategic objectives, he explained that: It is not the mission of our marines or of the [Multinational Force in Lebanon] as a whole to maintain the military balance in Lebanon by themselves. Nevertheless, their presence remains one crucial pillar of the structure of stability. They are an important deterrent, a symbol of the international backing behind the legitimate Government of Lebanon, and an important weight in the scales. To remove the marines would put both the Government and what we are trying to achieve in jeopardy. This is why our domestic controversy over the war powers has been so disturbing. Uncertainty about the American commitment can only weaken our effectiveness. Doubts about our staying power can only cause political aggressors to discount our presence or to intensify their attacks in hopes of hastening our departure. An accommodation between the President and Congress to resolve this dispute will help dispel those doubts about our staying power and strengthen our political hand.69 Following the spectacularly successful terrorist attack on the Marine barracks in Beirut, President Reagan withdrew the Marines. Osama bin Laden later cited this as an example of American weakness that could not withstand the jihadist fury he sought.70 The legal battles over the scope and effect of the War Powers Resolution have highlighted the focus on national political will as the fulcrum of successful military operations by requiring assurances that military operations are limited in nature, duration, and scope, and therefore well within the president’s constitutional authority as Commander-in-Chief and chief executive. President Obama’s report to Congress in the context of the Libya operations in 2011 cited precedent from air strikes in Bosnia that took just over two weeks and involved more than 2,300 US sorties and the deployment of US forces in Somalia in 1992 and Haiti in 1993.71 The White House released a memorandum from the OLC, similar to previous interventions, explaining how the authorization to use such force was constitutional on the basis that “‘war’ within the meaning of the [Constitution’s] Declaration of War Clause” does not encompass all military engagements, but only those that are “prolonged and substantial . . . typically involving exposure of U.S. military personnel to significant risk over a substantial period.” 72 President Obama consistently maintained that the US role in Libya was limited, unlikely to expose any US persons to attack (especially given the role of missiles and drones and the utter inability of Qaddafi’s forces to strike back with conventional means), and likely to end expeditiously.73 By that logic, it did not require authorization from Congress. The administration ultimately adopted a legal analysis that the US military’s activities fell short of “hostilities,” and thus, the president needed no permission from Congress to continue the mission after the expiration of the sixty-day reporting window specified in the War Powers Resolution.74 The president’s reasoning rested on previous OLC opinions that what counts as war depends on “a factspecific assessment of the ‘anticipated nature, scope, and duration’ of the planned military operations.” 75 Present justifications for bypassing the War Powers Resolution hinge on interpretations that it requires “prolonged and substantial military engagements, typically involving exposure of U.S. military personnel to significant risk over a substantial period.” 76 The OLC engaged in similar reasoning in the Bosnia intervention in 1995, explaining that in deciding whether the proposed deployment into Bosnia amounted to a “‘war’ in the constitutional sense, considerable weight was given to the consensual nature and protective purposes of the operation.” 77 That deployment was similarly intended to be a limited mission but that mission, in contrast to the present one, was in support of an agreement that the warring parties had reached and it was at the invitation of the parties that led to the belief that little or no resistance to the deployment would occur. Though some scholars argued that the Libya OLC Memorandum defended its reasoning for why the operation did not amount to “war,” it did not address whether the administration believed that it will have to stop operations upon expiration of the sixty-ninety-day clock under the War Powers Resolution.78 The deadline passed with little fanfare. The memorandum also relied upon quite distinguishable precedent to serve as a guiding point in this intervention. Professor Goldsmith argued the opinion broke “new ground . . . in its extension of the ‘no war’ precedents beyond the Bosnia and Haiti situations—which involved consensual peacekeeping-like introductions of ground troops but no significant uses of force—to cover two weeks of non-consensual aerial bombardments.” 79 Thus, even as it incentivizes short term, limited deployments, the War Powers Resolution embeds an inevitable constitutional collision between the coordinate branches. Our enemies can rely upon constitutional carping from Congress, and in fact can adapt tactics and statements that seek to undermine political will in the US Congress and among the American people from the first days of an operation. The Resolution helps to ensure that such debates over the national political will take center stage sooner rather than later, and an asymmetric enemy can in theory erode our political will even before it solidifies.

#### Alt causes to power projection failure – Domestic gridlock and China

Jakarta Globe – 10/5/13, Robertus Wardi & Abdul Khalik , Obama’s Absence is Chance for China to Steal the Show, http://www.thejakartaglobe.com/news/obamas-absence-is-chance-for-china-to-steal-the-show/

The absence of US President Barack Obama at two key Asia meetings next week could be a pivotal moment in China’s dominance in the region, analysts here said, raising questions about the United States’ capacity to extend its influence to other parts of the world when it is forced to grapple with problems at home. On Thursday, Obama canceled his attendance in the Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC) conference taking place in Bali from Oct. 7-8 and the East Asia Summit in Brunei later in the week, blaming the US government shutdown for the cancelation of a tour designed to advance a central prong of his foreign policy. Instead, US Secretary of State John Kerry will take Obama’s place so that the president can stay home to focus on the budget gridlock in Washington that triggered the first government shutdown in 17 years. Obama was scheduled to meet Russian President Vladimir Putin, Chinese President Xi Jinping and Japanese Prime Minister Shinzo Abe, among other leaders, at the summits. Two of his main aims would have been to discuss the Syria crisis with Putin and to hold talks on a maritime code of conduct for disputed territories in the oil- and gas-rich South China Sea. “We are disappointed,” Indonesian Information Minister Tifatul Sembiring said in Bali. “I think the summit will go on, there is a long-term plan. But without Obama, you can imagine how disappointed we are. We could hardly imagine he wouldn’t come.” Indonesian analysts said China looked to dominate the two meetings, and would come up with initiatives, while boosting further its aids, investment and trades with countries in Asia. “Obama’s cancelation clearly gives China an upper hand over the US in their rivalry for influence in the region,” Aleksius Jemadu, dean of Pelita Harapan University’s School of Social and Political Sciences, said. He said that while it was too soon to declare “the end of American hegemony in Asia with Obama’s failure to attend the meetings, US allies in the region would question the seriousness behind the rhetoric of Asia focus Obama administration has been trying to work on. “It may be too soon to say it’s the end of American empire as we know it because of this setback, as many parameters need to be reviewed. We, however, notice that there is something wrong with the way US runs its economy. I think at least in Asia, the signs of US losing influence are already apparent with China is aggressively investing and trading with countries in the region,” Aleksius said. Indonesian President Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono and Chinese President Xi Jinping on Thursday witnessed the signing of 23 new business agreements valued at almost $33 billion between the two nations, during the latter’s first trip to Southeast Asia since being elected. On Friday, Xi and Malaysian Prime Minister Najib Razak held a meeting soon after Obama canceled his trip to Kuala Lumpur with both countries set to elevate bilateral ties to a “comprehensive strategic partnership,” aiming to boost military cooperation and nearly triple two-way trade to $160 billion by 2017. China has been steadily increasing its influence in the region in recent years, and faced with China’s growing influence across the region, Obama announced in 2011 a pivot towards Asia as the US brought wars in Iraq and Afghanistan to an end. Malaysia is one of several Asian nations that has competing territorial claims with China over the resource-rich South China Sea, but it has kept a lower profile in the dispute than the Philippines and Vietnam and downplays regional concerns over Beijing’s rising military clout. Indonesian Defense University expert Bantarto Bandoro said China could fill the void left by the United States, which could be too preoccupied by domestic concerns. “If Obama decides not to attend APEC in Bali, then China could steal the show, and this could be a pivotal start of bigger influence in the future,” he said. “For now, US domestic political reality hinders the country’s capability and outreach to stage presence and influence far away from home. It could be the beginning of an end of American global dominance,” he said.

#### Their unit cohesion evidence from over a decade ago is too old – Iraq and Afghanistan should non-unique the link

#### National security scandals had decimated US soft power and our ability to export institutions

Andranik Migranyan – 7/5/13, director of the Institute for Democracy and Cooperation in New York, Scandals Harm U.S. Soft Power, the National Interest, <http://nationalinterest.org/commentary/scandals-harm-us-soft-power-8695>

For the past few months, the United States has been rocked by a series of scandals. It all started with the events in Benghazi, when Al Qaeda-affiliated terrorists attacked the General Consulate there and murdered four diplomats, including the U.S. ambassador to Libya. Then there was the scandal exposed when it was revealed that the Justice Department was monitoring the calls of the Associated Press. The Internal Revenue Service seems to have targeted certain political groups. Finally, there was the vast National Security Agency apparatus for monitoring online activity revealed by Edward Snowden. Together, these events provoke a number of questions about the path taken by contemporary Western societies, and especially the one taken by America. Large and powerful institutions, especially those in the security sphere, have become unaccountable to the public, even to representatives of the people themselves. Have George Orwell’s cautionary tales of total government control over society been realized? At the end of the 1960s and the beginning of the 1970s, my fellow students and I read Orwell’s 1984 and other dystopian stories and believed them to portray fascist Germany or the Soviet Union—two totalitarian regimes—but today it has become increasingly apparent that Orwell, Huxley and other dystopian authors had seen in their own countries (Britain and the United States) certain trends, especially as technological capabilities grew, that would ultimately allow governments to exert total control over their societies. The potential for this type of all-knowing regime is what Edward Snowden revealed, confirming the worst fears that the dystopias are already being realized. On a practical geopolitical level, the spying scandals have seriously tarnished the reputation of the United States. They have circumscribed its ability to exert soft power; the same influence that made the U.S. model very attractive to the rest of the world. This former lustre is now diminished. The blatant everyday intrusions into the private lives of Americans, and violations of individual rights and liberties by runaway, unaccountable U.S. government agencies, have deprived the United States of its authority to dictate how others must live and what others must do. Washington can no longer lecture others when its very foundational institutions and values are being discredited—or at a minimum, when all is not well “in the state of Denmark.” Perhaps precisely because not all is well, many American politicians seem unable to adequately address the current situation. Instead of asking what isn’t working in the government and how to ensure accountability and transparency in their institutions, they try, in their annoyance, to blame the messenger—as they are doing in Snowden’s case. Some Senators hurried to blame Russia and Ecuador for anti-American behavior, and threatened to punish them should they offer asylum to Snowden. These threats could only cause confusion in sober minds, as every sovereign country retains the right to issue or deny asylum to whomever it pleases. In addition, the United States itself has a tradition of always offering political asylum to deserters of the secret services of other countries, especially in the case of the former Soviet Union and other ex-socialist countries. In those situations, the United States never gave any consideration to how those other countries might react—it considered the deserters sources of valuable information. As long as deserters have not had a criminal and murderous past, they can receive political asylum in any country that considers itself sovereign and can stand up to any pressure and blackmail. Meanwhile, the hysteria of some politicians, if the State Department or other institutions of the executive branch join it, can only accelerate the process of Snowden’s asylum. For any country he might ask will only be more willing to demonstrate its own sovereignty and dignity by standing up to a bully that tries to dictate conditions to it. In our particular case, political pressure on Russia and President Putin could turn out to be utterly counterproductive. I believe that Washington has enough levelheaded people to understand that fact, and correctly advise the White House. The administration will need sound advice, as many people in Congress fail to understand the consequences of their calls for punishment of sovereign countries or foreign political leaders that don’t dance to Washington’s tune. Judging by the latest exchange between Moscow and Washington, it appears that the executive branches of both countries will find adequate solutions to the Snowden situation without attacks on each other’s dignity and self-esteem. Russia and the United States are both Security Council members, and much hinges on their decisions, including a slew of common problems that make cooperation necessary. Yet the recent series of scandals has caused irreparable damage to the image and soft power of the United States. I do not know how soon this damage can be repaired. But gone are the days when Orwell was seen as a relic of the Cold War, as the all-powerful Leviathan of the security services has run away from all accountability to state and society. Today the world is looking at America—and its model for governance—with a more critical eye.

#### Aff causes a fight between the President and Congress before every deployment – destroys US diplomacy – turns softer power and allied coop

Michael A. Newton – 2012, Professor of the Practice of Law, Vanderbilt University Law School

Inadvertent Implications of the War Powers Resolution, Case Western Reserve Journal of International Law, vol 45, Fall 2012, [http://law.case.edu/journals/JIL/Documents/45CaseWResJIntlL1&2.10.Article.Newton.pdf](http://law.case.edu/journals/JIL/Documents/45CaseWResJIntlL1%262.10.Article.Newton.pdf)

The War Powers Resolution is an outdated and demonstrably irrelevant relic of a bygone era of American political life. Its vestigial remains nevertheless result in heated debates between the coordinate branches of the federal government. This is especially true in the modern era of uncertainty regarding the precise scope of international authority for the use of force. At the time of this writing, debate continues over the adoption of the crime of aggression in the Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court. Current texts require that trans-state aggression must be “manifest” in order to warrant criminal sanction.87 The function of the threshold is twofold. First, it implies a magnitude test by referring to the gravity and scale of the act of aggression. Second, by referring to the character, the threshold poses a qualitative requirement: the state use of force must be unambiguously illegal. This qualitative aspect is very important because there has been extensive debate on whether Article 2(4) of the UN Charter is dead or useless because of its complete indeterminacy.88 The prohibition arising from international law on the use of force is surrounded by a legal grey area of some significance. The scope of anticipatory self-defense and forcible rescue operations at this juncture as well as some forms of humanitarian intervention remain defensible but unclear under international law. 89 In all those cases, reasonable international lawyers may disagree about the current state of the law. It would be thoroughly unwise to try to clarify this grey area through the back door of the international criminal justice system, and it is my opinion that the International Criminal Court should avoid these murky waters. However, unresolved domestic debates over the War Powers Resolution run the risk of undermining the US posture in these diplomatic debates even as they weaken national resolve and undermine the efficiency of our deployed forces. The War Powers Resolution should be repealed and replaced with a more modern and flexible formulation that balances these important needs and helps to ensure a synergy between the coordinate branches of government and the forces in the field.

#### Squo solves international cooperation and mutual restraint – Obama Doctrine

Aziz 13 (Omer, graduate student at Cambridge University, is a researcher at the Center for International and Defense Policy at Queen’s University, “The Obama Doctrine's Second Term,” Project Syndicate, 2-5, <http://www.project-syndicate.org/blog/the-obama-doctrine-s-second-term--by-omer-aziz>)

The Obama Doctrine’s first term has been a remarkable success. After the $3 trillion boondoggle in Iraq, a failed nation-building mission in Afghanistan, and the incessant saber-rattling of the previous Administration, President Obama was able to reorient U.S. foreign policy in a more restrained and realistic direction. He did this in a number of ways. First, an end to large ground wars. As Defense Secretary Robert Gates put it in February 2011, anyone who advised future presidents to conduct massive ground operations ought “to have [their] head examined.” Second, a reliance on Secret Operations and drones to go after both members of al Qaeda and other terrorist outfits in Pakistan as well as East Africa. Third, a rebalancing of U.S. foreign policy towards the Asia-Pacific — a region neglected during George W. Bush's terms but one that possesses a majority of the world’s nuclear powers, half the world’s GDP, and tomorrow’s potential threats. Finally, under Obama's leadership, the United States has finally begun to ask allies to pick up the tab on some of their security costs. With the U.S. fiscal situation necessitating retrenchment, coupled with a lack of appetite on the part of the American public for foreign policy adventurism, Obama has begun the arduous process of burden-sharing necessary to maintain American strength at home and abroad. What this amounted to over the past four years was a vigorous and unilateral pursuit of narrow national interests and a multilateral pursuit of interests only indirectly affecting the United States. Turkey, a Western ally, is now leading the campaign against Bashar al-Assad’s regime in Syria. Japan, Korea, India, the Philippines, Myanmar, and Australia all now act as de facto balancers of an increasingly assertive China. With the withdrawal of two troop brigades from the continent, Europe is being asked to start looking after its own security. In other words, the days of free security and therefore, free riding, are now over. The results of a more restrained foreign policy are plentiful. Obama was able to assemble a diverse coalition of states to execute regime-change in Libya where there is now a moderate democratic government in place. Libya remains a democracy in transition, but the possibilities of self-government are ripe. What’s more, the United States was able to do it on the cheap. Iran’s enrichment program has been hampered by the clandestine cyber program codenamed Olympic Games. While Mullah Omar remains at large, al Qaeda’s leadership in Afghanistan and Pakistan has been virtually decimated. With China, the United States has maintained a policy of engagement and explicitly rejected a containment strategy, though there is now something resembling a cool war — not yet a cold war — as Noah Feldman of Harvard Law School puts it, between the two economic giants. The phrase that best describes the Obama Doctrine is one that was used by an anonymous Administration official during the Libya campaign and then picked up by Republicans as a talking point: Leading From Behind. The origin of the term dates not to weak-kneed Democratic orthodoxy but to Nelson Mandela, who wrote in his autobiography that true leadership often required navigating and dictating aims ‘from behind.’ The term, when applied to U.S. foreign policy, has a degree of metaphorical verity to it: Obama has led from behind the scenes in pursuing terrorists and militants, is shifting some of the prodigious expenses of international security to others, and has begun the U.S. pivot to the Asia-Pacific region. The Iraq War may seem to be a distant memory to many in North America, but its after-effects in the Middle East and Asia tarnished the United States' image abroad and rendered claims to moral superiority risible. Leading From Behind is the final nail in the coffin of the neoconservatives' failed imperial policies.

#### Soft power fails - empirics

Drezner 11

Daniel W. Drezner, Professor of International Politics at the Fletcher School of Law and Diplomacy at Tufts University, Foreign Affairs, July/August 2011, "Does Obama Have a Grand Strategy?", <http://www.foreignaffairs.com/print/67869>

What went wrong? The administration, and many others, erred in believing that improved standing would give the United States greater policy leverage. The United States' standing among foreign publics and elites did rebound. But this shift did not translate into an appreciable increase in the United States' soft power. Bargaining in the G-20 and the UN Security Council did not get any easier. Soft power, it turns out, cannot accomplish much in the absence of a willingness to use hard power. The other problem was that China, Russia, and other aspiring great powers did not view themselves as partners of the United States. Even allies saw the Obama administration's supposed modesty as a cover for shifting the burden of providing global public goods from the United States to the rest of the world. The administration's grand strategy was therefore perceived as promoting narrow U.S. interests rather than global public goods.

### **UN**

#### **Your author says 6 other factors DESTROY the U.N.**

Thakur 12 – Ramesh Thakur, Professor of International Relations and Foundation Director of the Centre for Nuclear Nonproliferation and Disarmament at the Australian National University, “The United Nations in Global Governance: Rebalancing Organized Multilateralism for Current and Future Challenges”,<http://www.un.org/en/ga/president/65/initiatives/GlobalGovernance/Thakur_GA_Thematic_Debate_on_UN_in_GG.pdf>

The challenge of global governance – governance for the world to produce order, stability and predictability even in the absence of a world government – is sixfold: 1. The evolution of international organizations to facilitate robust global responses lags behind the emergence of collective action problems; 2. The most pressing problems – nuclear weapons, terrorism, pandemics, food, water and fuel scarcity, climate change, agricultural trade – are global in scope and require global solutions: problems without passports in search of solutions without passports. But the policy authority and legal capacity for coercive mobilization of the required resources for tackling them remain vested in states; 3. There is a disconnect between the distribution of decision‐making authority in international institutions and the distribution of military, diplomatic and economic power in the real world; 4. There is also a disconnect between the concentration of decision‐making authority in intergovernmental forums and the diffusion of decision‐shaping influence among nonstate actors like markets, corporations and civil society actors; 5. There is a mutually undermining gap between legitimacy and efficiency. Precisely what made the G8 summits unique and valuable – informal meetings between a small number of the world’s most powerful government leaders behind closed doors on a first name basis, without intermediaries and with no notes being taken – is what provoked charges of hegemonism, secrecy, opaqueness, and lack of representation and legitimacy. The very feature that gives the United Nations its unique legitimacy, universal membership, makes it an inefficient body for making, implementing and enforcing collective decisions; 6. During the Cold War, the main axis around which world affairs rotated was East– West. Today this has morphed into a North–South axis. The Copenhagen conference on climate change was suboptimal in outcome in part because of the colliding worldviews of the global North and South. The net result of the sixfold governance deficits is to disempower, disable and incapacitate joint decision‐making for solving collective action problems. As a corollary, the fundamental challenge for the international community is how to restructure and reform the United Nations in order to reposition it at the centre of collective efforts to manage current and anticipated global problems over the next quarter and half century.

#### **The U.N. fails and they can’t solve global lack of support**

Kenny 8/26, Kenny is a fellow at the Center for Global Development and the New America Foundation., <http://www.businessweek.com/articles/2013-08-26/the-united-nations-isnt-failing-its-members-are>

Last week was a grim one for the reputation of the United Nations. In the face of mounting evidence of a large-scale chemical weapons attack by the Syrian regime, and with more than one million children made refugees by the civil war, the U.N. Security Council responded with a statement of “serious concern.” It is doubtful that this was much comfort to the victims and their families.

It is hardly the first time the international body dedicated to global peace and development has looked irrelevant in the face of crisis. But for all of those failures, alongside the corruption and byzantine bureaucracy of the organization, two recent academic studies suggest that adequately supported U.N. operations have often had a big role in promoting peace and stability—significantly reducing civilian deaths in conflict and helping to consolidate democracies. This suggests that the blame for the U.N.’s failures should be borne in large part by the countries that provide the authorization, troops, and funding for operations, not the organization itself.

There are 92,000 police and troops alongside 19,000 volunteers and civilian personnel [currently engaged](http://www.un.org/en/peacekeeping/resources/statistics/factsheet.shtml) in 15 separate peacekeeping operations around the world. That includes operations with more than 8,000 troops in Sudan and South Sudan, Cote d’Ivoire, Lebanon, and Democratic Republic of Congo. U.N. peacekeeping operations have been complicit in no shortage of calamities over the years—from the failure to prevent genocide in Rwanda, through a massacre in[Srebrenica](http://www.nytimes.com/1999/11/16/world/un-details-its-failure-to-stop-95-bosnia-massacre.html) and rapes in DR Congo, and on to the introduction of cholera in [Haiti](http://www.economist.com/blogs/americasview/2013/07/cholera-haiti) via U.N. forces. Most shamelessly, the organization has often resorted to stonewalling and inaction when it comes to compensating victims.

Despite these appalling cases, the U.N. has become increasingly central in the global effort to “to save succeeding generations from the scourge of war,” the first aim of the United Nations charter. Multilateral peacekeeping operations cost a little over $7 billion—or less than half a percent of the global military budget. But research suggests they’re having a significant impact on reducing global levels of violence. In an effort to assess the effectiveness of UN peacekeeping, Jacob Kathman of SUNY Buffalo, with Lisa Hultman at Uppsala University and Megan Shannon of Florida State University, [analyzed](https://www.gspia.pitt.edu/LinkClick.aspx?fileticket=jwfVC_dMuig%3D&tabid=1406) (PDF) monthly data on the number and type of U.N. peacekeepers—alongside civilian deaths—from 1991 to 2008 in armed conflicts in Africa. Based on their sample, they find that an average of 106 civilians are killed in a given month in conflicts that lack UN presence. In places with a blue-helmet presence of at least 8,000—the size of the UN’s larger operations—the expected number of civilian deaths per month drops to fewer than two.

“Peacekeeping successfully reduces civilian suffering if the UN commits larger numbers of appropriately tasked personnel to a conflict” the researchers conclude.  The relationship may not always be that simple—peacekeeping operations often ramp up only after the worst of the fighting has passed. Nonetheless, it does appear that a large U.N. presence can contain violence.

Kathman and colleagues point to Sierra Leone as an example. As violence increased in the late 1990s, the local UN observer mission called for greater support. An expanded mission was launched in 1999 and as troops arrived, violence declined. In separate research, Madhav Joshi of the University of Notre Dame suggests that U.N. peacekeeping operations may also help to support democracy building—sustaining peace and rights, even after missions have ended.

All of which suggests that the failings of U.N. peacekeeping operations are due in large part to the unwillingness of U.N. member countries—and in particular, the U.N. Security Council—to support operations aggressively enough. Again, the limited capacity of the UN to deal with other global challenges, from disease to global warming, is not just about the weaknesses of the institution—it is closely connected to its pathetic levels of funding. The U.N. family’s donor budget for maintaining planetary public goods from climate to basic agricultural research to biodiversity amounts to about [$3 billion](http://www.cgdev.org/publication/find-me-money-financing-climate-and-other-global-public-goods-working-paper-248) a year, roughly the cost of a recently proposed street repair program for the City of Los Angeles, or what Americans spend partying on the Fourth of July.

While incompetence, inefficiency and corruption pose problems for the U.N., by far the biggest problem is incapacity. That’s mostly the fault of short-sighted, parochial, and penny-pinching member states, not the staff and diplomats at U.N. headquarters in Turtle Bay.

#### Saudi rejection makes decline inevitable and the U.N. fails

LAT 10/18, Los Angeles Times, <http://articles.latimes.com/2013/oct/18/world/la-fg-wn-saudi-arabia-united-nations-security-council-20131018>

A day after the United Nations elected Saudi Arabia to a prestigious seat on the Security Council, the Saudi leadership refused to accept the position and lashed out at the world body for "double standards" and failure to protect peace.

It was a stunning and unprecedented rebuke of the U.N. Security Council, diplomats and academics said, especially after the recent breakthrough in getting the unanimous approval of the 15-member council on a plan to rid Syria of its chemical weapons.

The Saudi ambassador to the United Nations, Abdallah al Mouallimi, on Thursday hailed [Riyadh's election](http://www.latimes.com.preview.tribdev.com/world/worldnow/la-fg-wn-un-security-council-saudi-arabia-chad-20131017%2C0%2C5200025.story) to a two-year stint on the Security Council as recognition of the country's "long-standing policy in support of moderation and in support of resolving disputes by peaceful means."

But on Friday, the Saudi Foreign Ministry announced that it was rejecting the seat and issued a bitter denunciation of the council's failure over 65 years to resolve the Israeli-Palestinian conflict and its refusal to ensure a Middle East free of weapons of mass destruction, an apparent reference to Israel, widely believed to have a nuclear arsenal.

"Allowing the ruling regime in Syria to kill and burn its people by the chemical weapons, while the world stands idly, without applying deterrent sanctions against the Damascus regime, is also irrefutable evidence and proof of the inability of the Security Council to carry out its duties and responsibilities," the Foreign Ministry said in a statement carried by the official [Saudi Press Agency](http://www.spa.gov.sa/English/index.php).

"Saudi Arabia believes that the manner, the mechanisms of action and double standards existing in the Security Council prevent it from performing its duties and assuming its responsibilities towards preserving international peace and security as required, leading to the continued disruption of peace and security, the expansion of the injustices against the peoples, the violation of rights and the spread of conflicts and wars around the world," the government said.

### Solvency

#### Neither the courts nor Congress want to play a role in authorizing war – they won’t enforce the aff

Gene Healy 2009 (vice president at the Cato Institute) “Reclaiming the War Power” http://object.cato.org/sites/cato.org/files/serials/files/cato-handbook-policymakers/2009/9/hb111-10.pdf

Each of these proposals has the merit of demanding that Congress carry the burden the Constitution places upon it: responsibility for the decision to go to war. The Gelb-Slaughter plan shows particular promise. Although Congress hasn’t declared war since 1942, reviving the formal declaration would make it harder for legislators to punt that decision to the president, as they did in Vietnam and Iraq. Hawks should see merit in making declarations mandatory, since a declaration commits those who voted for it to support the president and provide the resources he needs to prosecute the war successfully. Doves too should find much to applaud in the idea: forcing Congress to take a stand might concentrate the mind wonderfully and reduce the chances that we will find ourselves spending blood and treasure in conflicts that were not carefully examined at the outset. But we should be clear about the difficulties that comprehensive war powers reform entails. Each of these reforms presupposes a Congress eager to be held accountable for its decisions, a judiciary with a stomach for interbranch struggles, and a voting public that rewards political actors who fight to put the presidency in its place. Representative Jones’s Constitutional War Powers Resolution, which seeks to draw the judiciary into the struggle to constrain executive war making, ignores the Court’s resistance to congressional standing, as well as the 30-year history of litigation under the War Powers Resolution, a history that shows how adept the federal judiciary is at constructing rationales that allow it to avoid picking sides in battles between Congress and the president. Even if Jones’s Constitutional War Powers Resolution or Ely’s Combat Authorization Act could be passed today, and even if the courts, defying most past practice, grew bold enough to rule on whether hostilities were imminent, there would be still another difficulty; as Ely put it: ‘‘When we got down to cases and a court remanded the issue to Congress, would Congress actually be able to follow through and face the issue whether the war in question should be permitted to proceed? Admittedly, the matter is not entirely free from doubt.’’ It’s worth thinking about how best to tie Ulysses to the mast. But the problem with legislative schemes designed to force Congress to ‘‘do the right thing’’ is that Congress seems always to have one hand free. Statutory schemes designed to precommit legislators to particular procedures do not have a terribly promising track record. Historically, many such schemes have proved little more effective than a dieter’s note on the refrigerator. No mere statute can truly bind a future Congress, and in areas ranging from agricultural policy to balanced budgets, Congress has rarely hesitated to undo past agreements in the pursuit of short-term political advantage. A : 14431$CH10 11-11-08 14:18:58 Page 113 Layout: 14431 : Odd 113 C ATO H ANDBOOK FOR P OLICYMAKERS If checks on executive power are to be restored, we will need far less Red Team–Blue Team politicking—and many more legislators than we currently have who are willing to put the Constitution ahead of party loyalty. That in turn will depend on a public willing to hold legislators accountable for ducking war powers fights and ceding vast authority to the president. Congressional courage of the kind needed to reclaim the war power will not be forthcoming unless and until American citizens demand it.

#### Aff is circumvented – plan does none of the things 1ac author says is key – and the WPR proves enforcement is not normal means, so it won’t exist if the aff doesn’t explicitly fiat it

Lobel – 1ac author – 9

Jules Lobel, Professor of Law at the University of Pittsburgh, “Restore. Protect. Expand. Amend the War Powers Resolution,” Center for Constitutional Rights White Paper, http://ccrjustice.org/files/CCR\_White\_WarPowers.pdf

Reform the War Powers Resolution The War Powers Resolution has failed. Every president since the enactment of the Act has considered it to be unconstitutional. Presidents have generally not filed a report that would start the 60-day clock running, despite repeated executive introduction of armed forces into places like Indochina, Iran, Lebanon, Central America, Grenada, Libya, Bosnia, Haiti, Kosovo and Somalia, among others. Congress has usually not challenged this non-compliance. And, the judiciary has persistently refused to adjudicate claims challenging executive action as violating the War Powers Resolution, holding that members of Congress have no standing to seek relief, or that the claim presents non-justifiable political questions. The War Powers Resolution, as written, was flawed in several key respects. The first flaw was that the Resolution imposed no operative, substantive limitations on the executive’s power to initiate warfare, but rather created a time limit of 60 days on the president’s use of troops in hostile situations without explicit congressional authorization. This approach was a mistake, because as a practical matter it recognized that the President could engage in unilateral war-making for up to 60 days, or 90 days with an extension. But the Constitution requires that Congress provide authorization prior to initiating non-defensive war, not within a period of months after warfare is initiated. As history has demonstrated time and again, it is difficult to terminate warfare once hostilities have begun. The key time for Congress to weigh in is before hostilities are commenced, not 60 or 90 days afterward. Secondly, the War Powers Resolution correctly recognized that even congressional silence, inaction or even implicit approval does not allow the president to engage in warfare – but it failed to provide an adequate enforcement mechanism if the president did so. Under the resolution, wars launched by the executive were supposed to be automatically terminated after 60 or 90 days if not affirmatively authorized by Congress – but this provision proved unenforceable. Presidents simply ignored it, Congress had an insufficient interest in enforcing it and the courts responded by effectually saying: if Congress did nothing, why should we?

**<AFF CARD STARTS>**

Reforming the War Powers Resolution is a project that will require leadership from the President and the political will of Congress, working together in the service and preservation of the Constitution. In light of the abuses that have taken place under the Bush administration, it is the responsibility of a new administration to insist on transparency in the drafting of new legislation. There is a long history of attempts to revise the War Powers Resolution. As new legislation is drafted, though, it will be important to focus on the central constitutional issues. Much time has been spent in debating how to address contingencies. It will be impossible to write into law any comprehensive formula for every conceivable situation, though; much more important will be establishing the fundamental principles of reform: The War Powers Resolution should explicitly prohibit executive acts of war without previous Congressional authorization. The only exception should be the executive’s power in an emergency to use short-term force to repel sudden attacks on US territories, troops or citizens. It is true that many potential conflict situations will be murky, complicated or divisive, and that quick congressional action may not always be forthcoming. Yet, history shows the folly of launching wars that are not supported by the American people. The United States should not use military force until a substantial consensus develops in Congress and the public that military force is necessary, appropriate and wise. Today, as in 1787, the reality is that the interests of the people of the United States are best served if the Congress retains the power to declare war, and the President’s unilateral power to use American forces in combat should be reserved to repelling attacks on American troops or territories and evacuating citizens under actual attack. Repelling does not equate retaliation for an attack on an American city that occurred in the past, be it several days, weeks or months prior; it also does not mean launching a surprise invasion of a nation that has not attacked us. Repelling similarly does not permit the inflation of supposed threats against US citizens as justification to invade another country, as was the case in the Dominican Republic in 1965 and Grenada in 1983. The president can respond defensively to attacks that have been launched or are in the process of being launched, but not to rumors, reports, intuitions, or warnings of attacks. Preventive war, disguised as preemptive war, has no place in constitutional or international law. To ensure that this principle is enforced, new legislation should prohibit the use of appropriated funds for any executive use of force that is unauthorized under the statute. Furthermore, the reformed War Powers Resolution must allow room for judicial oversight in the case of conflicts. A president who initiates hostilities in disregard of the statute would undoubtedly use appropriated funds to do so, forcing Congress to make the difficult decision of whether to authorize funds for troops engaged in combat. The statute should therefore state that a presidential violation of the act would create an impasse with Congress, and that separation of powers principles require the Court to decide the merits of any challenge brought against an alleged violation. And, a presidential violation of this principle should be explicitly made an impeachable offense.

# 2NC

## Israel PIC

### 2NC Impact – Hezbollah/Hamas

#### Enhanced Israeli security concerns cause it to escalate against Hezbollah

Kelman 07, Co-chair Middle East Seminar Harvard

(Herbert C.-, Fall, Middle East Policy, “Israeli-Palestinian Peace: Inching Toward and Looking Beyond Negotiations”, Vol. 14 #3, <http://www.mepc.org/journal_vol14/93Kelman.pdf>)

In Israel, recent events have generated profound concerns over the country’s loss of its deterrent power — both vis-à-vis Hezbollah and its presumed backers, Syria and Iran, and vis-à-vis the Palestinians. Israeli political and military leaders are worried that Israel can be seen as — and can indeed become — vulnerable to attacks from across its borders with Lebanon in the north, with Gaza in the south, and eventually with the West Bank in the middle of the country, borders that are close to Israel’s large population centers. Loss of Israel’s deterrent power represents a nightmare scenario for its leaders. The immediate response to that evidence of vulnerability has been the use of greater military force and massive retaliation against Hezbollah and Hamas. But this strikes me as a shortsighted response to the new reality.

#### Renewed conflict with Hezbollah spreads throughout the region – draws in Iran

Gerges 10, Professor Middle East Politics London School of Economics

(Fawaz, July, “The Next War? The Danger of the Lebanese-Israeli Border Igniting” Institute for Social Policy and Understanding, http://ispu.org/pdfs/315\_PB\_ISPU-Next%20War.pdf)

London: In an important and alarming report to the U.N. Security Council in early July 2010, Secretary-General Ban Ki-Moon warned that rising tensions between Lebanon and Israel could lead to a new war with potentially devastating consequences for the entire region. He cited dozens of examples whereby the two warring camps - Israel and Hezbollah - almost came to blows and accused them of violating the 2006 cease-fire resolution that ended the 34-day war in 2006: Hezbollah maintains "a substantial military capacity," and Israel continues to conduct daily over-flights of Lebanon and refuses to withdraw from the disputed northern border village of Ghajar. Ban said Israeli accusations in April 2010 that neighboring Syria had provided Scud missiles to Hezbollah -- an allegation later raised by American officials and categorically denied by Lebanese and Syrian authorities -- "greatly increased tensions" among Israel, Lebanon, and Syria. "Rhetoric escalated rapidly, creating a perception in the public that a resumption of conflict was imminent," the secretary-general said. But for the moment, he added, tensions appear to have subsided. Nonetheless, he went on to say that the increased tension "raised the spectre of a miscalculation by either party leading to a resumption of hostilities, with potentially devastating consequences for Lebanon and the region." The U.N. general-secretary is not alone in warning of a possible Lebanon-Israel conflict. There is a real fear inside and outside the region that the southern Lebanon-Israel border area, one of the most militarized zones in the world, might supply the spark that ignites a regional conflagration. This fear is based on the fact that tensions between the Jewish state and its small Arab neighbor have recently escalated to the boiling point. On the one hand, Israel accuses Syria and Iran of supplying Hezbollah with long-range missiles that reach deep into its urban centers and threaten to tilt the balance of power in favor of the resistance camp. On the other hand, Hezbollah demands that Israel withdraw from occupied Lebanese land and stop violating Lebanese sovereignty. After the 2006 war, the Israeli army tried to learn the lessons of its dismal performance against Hezbollah and conducted huge military exercises on the Lebanese and Syrian borders. There is general agreement within the Israeli foreign policy and military establishment that the status quo is unacceptable and that Israel must repair the damage done to its deterrence capabilities in 2006. The conventional wisdom in Israel says that this would require cutting Hezbollah down to size and destroying its missile depots. Similarly, Hezbollah has acquired a greater missile capability and has positioned itself for the next round. Desperate to restore Israel's deterrence at all costs, the right-wing governing coalition has reportedly prepared contingency plans to reoccupy southern Lebanon. In the past year, Israeli officials have repeatedly threatened to wage an all-out war against Hezbollah and the Lebanese state; nothing would be spared, including Lebanon's civilian infrastructure and institutions. Although some observers might dismiss these threats as rhetoric designed to deter Hezbollah, Syria, and Iran, past Israeli conduct and history show a consistent pattern of military recklessness and disregard of common sense. Time and again, Israel has preempted any neighboring Arab state that sought to obtain a credible deterrence. Therefore, understanding Israel's official mindset and relations with neighboring Lebanon provide a context and a key to unlocking the riddle of the next war. A new book by David Hirst, the Guardian's long-term Middle East correspondent - Beware of Small States: Lebanon, Battleground of the Middle East - has just come out. In it, he warns that the next Arab-Israeli war might break out on the Lebanese-Israeli front. Statesmen and soldiers ignore Hirst's warning at their own peril. Beware of Small States is a history of the Arab-Israeli conflict as seen through the prism of its impact on the internal development of neighboring Arab states, particularly tiny, fragile Lebanon, the sectarian state par excellence and historic battleground for other peoples' conflicts. Few people are as qualified as Hirst to venture such a forecast and to write a history of Lebanon, the war-torn country in which he has resided and studied for half a century. He has witnessed and reported on most of the events described in this book, a fact that gives his narrative the intellectual credibility and intensity often lacking in other accounts. For him, the starting point is Israel's 1982 invasion of Lebanon, a pivotal development that changed the face of the entire region. In the 1970s Lebanon was plunged into all-out civil war and, by the time of the Israeli invasion, Hirst notes that “Greater-Israel expansionists” such as right-wing Likud Prime Minister Menachem Begin and Defense Minister Ariel Sharon saw in Lebanon's disintegration a historic opportunity to redraw the geopolitical map of the Middle East in a way that would allow Israel to secure the whole of Palestine for themselves and extinguish any rival claims to the Occupied Territories (p. 131). Hirst writes astutely that Israel's imperial hubris coincided with the advent of the Reagan administration; as Begin acknowledged, there had never been an administration so favorable to Israel as this one. No wonder then, he says, that before Begin and Sharon sent their army into Lebanon - 90,000 soldiers, 1,300 tanks, and 1,500 armored personnel carriers - they got a green light from Secretary of State Alexander Haig that was so phrased that a man like Sharon could only see it “as a hunting licence” (pp. 136-37). The 1982 war killed 20,000 people, mostly civilians. Israel besieged an Arab capital (Beirut), drove out Yasser Arafat and the PLO leadership and destroyed the guerrilla state-within-the state, and presided over the Lebanese Forces' slaughter of 3,000 Palestinian civilians in the Sabra and Shatila refugee camps. Far from learning from history, targeting civilians has emerged as the very essence of Israel's deterrence, as demonstrated by its more recent wars against Hezbollah (2006) and Hamas (2009) (pp. 116, 160). The significance of the 1982 war (which lasted until 2000) lies in how it transformed Lebanese domestic politics and the Arab-Israeli conflict. The war inflicted irreparable damage upon Israel's aura of invincibility and created a new Shiite enemy from whose ranks arose a grass-roots resistance movement, Hezbollah, that would prove to be far more formidable than the largely bureaucratic and corrupt PLO. “Had the enemy not taken this step,” said its leader Hassan Nasrallah many years later, “I don't know whether something called Hezbollah would have been born. I doubt it” (p. 183). Hezbollah now projects itself as the spearhead of the whole Arab/Muslim struggle against the Jewish state, and much of the global Muslim community seems to see it that way too. According to the author, Israel's colossal strategic and moral failure in Lebanon further delegitimized such pro-American “moderate” Arab regimes as Egypt and Saudi Arabia and strengthened the Islamo-nationalist resistance camp led by Iran and Syria. In his post-2006 war speech, Nasrallah told the immense, euphoric throng that the victory they were celebrating had transformed Lebanon from a “small” state in the Middle East into a “great” one. Hirst agrees that Lebanon is no longer the hapless object of others' actions but an active agent in its own right because of Hezbollah's powerful influence in the region. “Lebanon - the eternal victim - has now become the perpetrator too, posing no less a threat to greater states than they habitually posed to it.” That is a mixed blessing. Hirst cites Israeli leaders who say they are readying themselves for the “next war,” the “second round” against Hezbollah and the Lebanese state, which they deem to be all but inevitable. And while Hezbollah has evolved into a conventional political party with a domestic agenda, he argues that it still possesses a potent armed militia with an external, visionary, Islamist agenda and is aligned with Iranian and even Syrian foreign policy (p. 426). In other words, Lebanon remains a battlefield for its neighbors' wars. The only difference now is that if Israel fires the first shot in the “seventh Middle Eastern war,” the war might not remain confined to Lebanon. Other members of the Islamo-nationlist camp, such as Hamas, Syria, and heavyweight Iran, might join in. Thus, war would come to the entire Middle East.

#### Middle east war draws in major powers and causes global nuclear war

Russell 09, Editor of Strategic Insights

(James- Senior Lecturer Department of National Security Affairs, Spring, “Strategic Stability Reconsidered: Prospects for Escalation and Nuclear War in the Middle East” Security Studies Center Proliferation Papers, http://www.analyst-network.com/articles/141/StrategicStabilityReconsideredProspectsforEscalationandNuclearWarintheMiddleEast.pdf)

Strategic stability in the region is thus undermined by various factors: (1) asymmetric interests in the bargaining framework that can introduce unpredictable behavior from actors; (2) the presence of non-state actors that introduce unpredictability into relationships between the antagonists; (3) incompatible assumptions about the structure of the deterrent relationship that makes the bargaining framework strategically unstable; (4) perceptions by Israel and the United States that its window of opportunity for military action is closing, which could prompt a preventive attack; (5) the prospect that Iran’s response to pre-emptive attacks could involve unconventional weapons, which could prompt escalation by Israel and/or the United States; (6) the lack of a communications framework to build trust and cooperation among framework participants. These systemic weaknesses in the coercive bargaining framework all suggest that escalation by any the parties could happen either on purpose or as a result of miscalculation or the pressures of wartime circumstance. Given these factors, it is disturbingly easy to imagine scenarios under which a conflict could quickly escalate in which the regional antagonists would consider the use of chemical, biological, or nuclear weapons. It would be a mistake to believe the nuclear taboo can somehow magically keep nuclear weapons from being used in the context of an unstable strategic framework. Systemic asymmetries between actors in fact suggest a certain increase in the probability of war – a war in which escalation could happen quickly and from a variety of participants. Once such a war starts, events would likely develop a momentum all their own and decision-making would consequently be shaped in unpredictable ways. The international community must take this possibility seriously, and muster every tool at its disposal to prevent such an outcome, which would be an unprecedented disaster for the peoples of the region, with substantial risk for the entire world.

### AT: Permutation

#### Restrict means the aff must define the conditions in which use of armed forces is allowed

Cambridge Dictionary of American English 09

([http://dictionary.cambridge.org/define.asp?key=restrict\*1+0&dict=A](http://dictionary.cambridge.org/define.asp?key=restrict*1+0&dict=A);)

restrict verb [T] to limit (an intended action) esp. by setting the conditions under which it is allowed to happen

### AT: Solvency Deficit

#### The plan allows for 2nd strikes to defend allies- that includes almost half of the world

Campbell 04, VP & Direction International Security Program CSIS

(Kurt M.-, Spring, The Washington Quarterly, “The End of Alliances? Not So Fast”, Vol. 27 #2, Ebsco;)

The more relevant question then is not whether alliances are dead but rather how they are adapting to new exigencies and conditions. Many traditional alliances were created over the last 50 years or more as vehicles to provide a formal security guarantee by the United States and to facilitate rapid U.S. intervention in the face of foreign aggression, which at various times threatened to come from the Soviet Union and/or the People’s Republic of China.

During that time, the United States assembled important, formalized security relationships with virtually half of the world’s countries and pledged to defend nearly 50 treaty allies in the event of an attack, primarily to support a strategy of containing communism, which included assistance in major conflicts such as those in Korea and Vietnam. Some such alliances have been multilateral, most notably NATO, though others were attempted, such as the ill-fated Southeast Asia Treaty Organization (SEATO), but most were bilateral arrangements between the United States and countries in all regions throughout the globe.

### 2NC Link Wall

#### We’ll isolate several links

#### 1) Paranoia - Israeli insecurity and dependence forces them to carefully monitor changes in the U.S.’s military posture and roles - the plan will be vetted for clues about the future direction of American policy. They’ll be left asking why the U.S. crafts a policy that specifies who it defends and leaves them out

Steinberg 98

(Gerald-, Bar Ilan, Professor of Political Studies, Dec, MERIA, Vol. 2 #4)

Given the intensity of the relationship with the United States and degree of dependence, Israeli policymakers and analysts have carefully monitored and studied the implications of perceived changes in the American role, especially in the Middle East. Signs of increasing isolation at the political level, as well as changes in military posture and preparedness, military budgets, deployments, R&D programs, etc. are scrutinized in the search for clues regarding the future direction of the United States. Since the end of the Cold War, Israelis have become concerned regarding the role and capabilities of the United States. The history of isolationism is well known among the Israeli "foreign policy elite," and the emphasis on domestic policies during the 1992 presidential election, and particularly on the part of Clinton, raised some concerns regarding American disengagement. In addition, the Republican-controlled Congress exhibited increasingly isolationist tendencies, as evidenced by the policies of Senator Jesse Helms, who headed the Senate Foreign Relations Committee. Nevertheless, in practice, the Clinton administration turned out to be relatively pro-active in the Middle East, taking a major role following the agreement between Palestinian and Israeli negotiators (the Oslo agreement). Although isolationist elements in Congress had an increasingly important effect globally, it is difficult to discern a direct impact on American policy with respect to Israel.

#### 2) Reassurance - we don’t have to win the plan destroys all of relations only that it undermines the current strategy of consistent statements of commitment to Israel’s defense that’s key to maintain Israeli confidence and prevent pre-emption- that’s Murdock and also

Morrow 2K, Hoover Institute

(James D.-, June, Annual Review of Political Science, “Alliances: Why Write Them Down?”, Vol. 3, <http://arjournals>. annualreviews.org/doi/full/10.1146/annurev.polisci.3.1.63?amp;searchHistoryKey=%24{searchHistoryKey}&cookieSet=1)

Alliances operate in the shadow of war. They are explicit records of the allies' expectations of action in the case of war, and they specify the conditions under which the obligations are activated. However, states cannot be made to live up to their obligations to their allies. Obligations must be self-enforcing to be effective in international politics. Other states must believe that a state will live up to its alliance commitments, and when tested, a state will do so only if it is in its interest at that time. This first point of the necessity of self-enforcement is well understood in the literature on alliances and more generally in international politics. Alliances are not sufficient for the effective assistance of other states.

#### 3) Confidence – the plan undermines it by confirming Israeli suspicions that the world is against them. Even though under the plan congress could declare war to authorize a defense of Israel, the idea that it would have to do that for them but not France or Germany enhances threat perception and increases the risk of lashout

Halevi 2k, Editor New Republic

(Yossi Klein-, June 26, The Economist, “How Despair is Transforming Israel”, [http://www.factsofisrael.com/blog/ archives/000154.html](http://www.factsofisrael.com/blog/%20archives/000154.html))

The growing pessimism threatens Zionism's great psychological achievement: protecting the Jews from a fatal, post-Holocaust bitterness. Israel's founding preempted a massive Jewish rejection of the world, allowing survivors to turn rage into reconstruction. Israel even forced the Jews to make their peace with Europe. When David Ben-Gurion negotiated the German reparations agreement in the early '50s, resisting the violent opposition led by Begin, he compelled Israelis to choose pragmatism over history. But that choice should not be taken for granted. Perhaps the Holocaust's deepest long-term wound on the Jewish psyche isn't the actions of the murderers but the passivity of the onlookers. Jews must continually resist the suspicion that even the enlightened world cares little for their survival. The consequences--political, social, and theological--of feeding that suspicion could be shattering. Most Israelis, of course, still realize that "the world" doesn't hate the Jews. Even now, says Klieman, many Israelis insist on distinctions within the Arab world, let alone the world generally: "We still speak of Egypt and Syria rather than `the Arabs.'" The expansiveness of the '90s remains imprinted on the Israeli psyche and won't be easily forfeited. That's why Israelis seize on every sign of support from abroad. A recent pro-Israel demonstration in Rome, for example, received more coverage in the Israeli press than far larger demonstrations by American Jews, precisely because most of the participants in the Italian protest were reported to have been non-Jews. Most of all, it's American support that keeps Israelis from total despair. The United States is the great exception that doesn't prove the rule. It challenges the subversive Jewish voice that whispers, "Don't trust the goyim; at the moment of truth, they'll betray you." Israelis know that in moments of truth, the United States has stood with them and presumably will do so again. President George W. Bush's tacit endorsement, in his Rose Garden speech this week, of Sharon's strategy--denying Arafat's terrorist war any political gain--has reinforced Israeli faith in the United States.

#### 4. Crisis – geographic proximity increases the need for a timely response by the US in the case of an attack on Israel. After the plan Israel would be unsure whether congress would declare war so the US could deploy troops in time if they are attacked. That increases preemptive pressures

Kramer 13, President of Shalem College

(Martin, 9/17, Israel Likes Its U.S. Presidents Strong, www.commentarymagazine.com/2013/09/17/israel-likes-its-u-s-presidents-strong-2/

In light of this history, it’s not hard to see why Israel would view any handoff by a president to the Congress in the midst of a direct challenge to a presidential commitment as a sign of weakness and an indication that Israel had better start planning to act on its own. It’s not that Israel lacks friends on the Hill. But in crises where time is short and intelligence is ambivalent—and such are the crises Israel takes to the White House—Israel needs presidents who are decisive.

### AT: Syria Caused Link

#### Israel is comfortable with Syria developments – it doesn’t cross the threshold of our link because it doesn’t involve an attack against their homeland

Washington Post 2013 (September 12, “Israel divided over best course on Syria” <http://articles.washingtonpost.com/2013-09-12/world/41992570_1_israel-s-israeli-embassy-iran>)

Israel’s diplomatic and defense establishment appears to be divided over the best course of action to take on Syria, security analysts and former military commanders here said Thursday. It has been no secret that some of Israel’s political leaders and generals were initially disappointed that President Obama sought congressional approval for missile strikes, saying it showed weakness that would embolden Syrian President Bashar al-Assad and boost Iran and its nuclear ambitions. An analysis in the Times of Israel, citing unnamed sources, said that Obama’s decision to hit the pause button had “privately horrified” Jerusalem. But that was 12 days ago. Now, many Israelis have begun to identify some advantages in a Russia-brokered diplomatic deal to secure Assad’s stores of chemical weapons, especially if it succeeds. “Israel was watching the reaction of the international community, especially the United States, as a kind of test case on how they would react to the Iran situation,” said Oded Eran, former deputy chief of mission at the Israeli Embassy in Washington. “But now there are more Israelis who are looking at the possible deal between Russia and United States on the chemical arsenal of Syria as an interesting precedent,” Eran said. “If the international community, through the U.S. and Russia, is able to put its hands on, to monitor or collect all the arsenal of Syria, this could be some sort of a precedent concerning Iran.” Israel maintains that Iran is seeking to build a nuclear weapon, a development it has described as “an existential threat.” Iran says its nuclear program is limited to research and energy production. Israel Ziv, a retired major general and former head of the Israel Defense Forces’ operations directorate, said that from a strategic standpoint, a U.S. missile strike might not have achieved much and would have posed risks. “I don’t see anything positive coming from an attack,” Ziv said. “I see more positive results, potentially, on addressing Syria’s chemical weapon stockpiles.” Ziv said it took guts not to attack Syria.

## Case

### Warfighting

#### Finishing card

Michael A. Newton – 2012, Professor of the Practice of Law, Vanderbilt University Law School

Inadvertent Implications of the War Powers Resolution, Case Western Reserve Journal of International Law, vol 45, Fall 2012, [http://law.case.edu/journals/JIL/Documents/45CaseWResJIntlL1&2.10.Article.Newton.pdf](http://law.case.edu/journals/JIL/Documents/45CaseWResJIntlL1%262.10.Article.Newton.pdf)

 Doubts about our staying power can only cause political aggressors to discount our presence or to intensify their attacks in hopes of hastening our departure. An accommodation between the President and Congress to resolve this dispute will help dispel those doubts about our staying power and strengthen our political hand.69 Following the spectacularly successful terrorist attack on the Marine barracks in Beirut, President Reagan withdrew the Marines. Osama bin Laden later cited this as an example of American weakness that could not withstand the jihadist fury he sought.70 The legal battles over the scope and effect of the War Powers Resolution have highlighted the focus on national political will as the fulcrum of successful military operations by requiring assurances that military operations are limited in nature, duration, and scope, and therefore well within the president’s constitutional authority as Commander-in-Chief and chief executive. President Obama’s report to Congress in the context of the Libya operations in 2011 cited precedent from air strikes in Bosnia that took just over two weeks and involved more than 2,300 US sorties and the deployment of US forces in Somalia in 1992 and Haiti in 1993.71 The White House released a memorandum from the OLC, similar to previous interventions, explaining how the authorization to use such force was constitutional on the basis that “‘war’ within the meaning of the [Constitution’s] Declaration of War Clause” does not encompass all military engagements, but only those that are “prolonged and substantial . . . typically involving exposure of U.S. military personnel to significant risk over a substantial period.” 72 President Obama consistently maintained that the US role in Libya was limited, unlikely to expose any US persons to attack (especially given the role of missiles and drones and the utter inability of Qaddafi’s forces to strike back with conventional means), and likely to end expeditiously.73 By that logic, it did not require authorization from Congress. The administration ultimately adopted a legal analysis that the US military’s activities fell short of “hostilities,” and thus, the president needed no permission from Congress to continue the mission after the expiration of the sixty-day reporting window specified in the War Powers Resolution.74 The president’s reasoning rested on previous OLC opinions that what counts as war depends on “a factspecific assessment of the ‘anticipated nature, scope, and duration’ of the planned military operations.” 75 Present justifications for bypassing the War Powers Resolution hinge on interpretations that it requires “prolonged and substantial military engagements, typically involving exposure of U.S. military personnel to significant risk over a substantial period.” 76 The OLC engaged in similar reasoning in the Bosnia intervention in 1995, explaining that in deciding whether the proposed deployment into Bosnia amounted to a “‘war’ in the constitutional sense, considerable weight was given to the consensual nature and protective purposes of the operation.” 77 That deployment was similarly intended to be a limited mission but that mission, in contrast to the present one, was in support of an agreement that the warring parties had reached and it was at the invitation of the parties that led to the belief that little or no resistance to the deployment would occur. Though some scholars argued that the Libya OLC Memorandum defended its reasoning for why the operation did not amount to “war,” it did not address whether the administration believed that it will have to stop operations upon expiration of the sixty-ninety-day clock under the War Powers Resolution.78 The deadline passed with little fanfare. The memorandum also relied upon quite distinguishable precedent to serve as a guiding point in this intervention. Professor Goldsmith argued the opinion broke “new ground . . . in its extension of the ‘no war’ precedents beyond the Bosnia and Haiti situations—which involved consensual peacekeeping-like introductions of ground troops but no significant uses of force—to cover two weeks of non-consensual aerial bombardments.” 79 Thus, even as it incentivizes short term, limited deployments, the War Powers Resolution embeds an inevitable constitutional collision between the coordinate branches. Our enemies can rely upon constitutional carping from Congress, and in fact can adapt tactics and statements that seek to undermine political will in the US Congress and among the American people from the first days of an operation. The Resolution helps to ensure that such debates over the national political will take center stage sooner rather than later, and an asymmetric enemy can in theory erode our political will even before it solidifies.

#### Finishing card

Jakarta Globe – 10/5/13, Robertus Wardi & Abdul Khalik , Obama’s Absence is Chance for China to Steal the Show, http://www.thejakartaglobe.com/news/obamas-absence-is-chance-for-china-to-steal-the-show/

 in the region,” Aleksius said. Indonesian President Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono and Chinese President Xi Jinping on Thursday witnessed the signing of 23 new business agreements valued at almost $33 billion between the two nations, during the latter’s first trip to Southeast Asia since being elected. On Friday, Xi and Malaysian Prime Minister Najib Razak held a meeting soon after Obama canceled his trip to Kuala Lumpur with both countries set to elevate bilateral ties to a “comprehensive strategic partnership,” aiming to boost military cooperation and nearly triple two-way trade to $160 billion by 2017. China has been steadily increasing its influence in the region in recent years, and faced with China’s growing influence across the region, Obama announced in 2011 a pivot towards Asia as the US brought wars in Iraq and Afghanistan to an end. Malaysia is one of several Asian nations that has competing territorial claims with China over the resource-rich South China Sea, but it has kept a lower profile in the dispute than the Philippines and Vietnam and downplays regional concerns over Beijing’s rising military clout. Indonesian Defense University expert Bantarto Bandoro said China could fill the void left by the United States, which could be too preoccupied by domestic concerns. “If Obama decides not to attend APEC in Bali, then China could steal the show, and this could be a pivotal start of bigger influence in the future,” he said. “For now, US domestic political reality hinders the country’s capability and outreach to stage presence and influence far away from home. It could be the beginning of an end of American global dominance,” he said.

#### Finishing card

Andranik Migranyan – 7/5/13, director of the Institute for Democracy and Cooperation in New York, Scandals Harm U.S. Soft Power, the National Interest, <http://nationalinterest.org/commentary/scandals-harm-us-soft-power-8695>

Washington can no longer lecture others when its very foundational institutions and values are being discredited—or at a minimum, when all is not well “in the state of Denmark.” Perhaps precisely because not all is well, many American politicians seem unable to adequately address the current situation. Instead of asking what isn’t working in the government and how to ensure accountability and transparency in their institutions, they try, in their annoyance, to blame the messenger—as they are doing in Snowden’s case. Some Senators hurried to blame Russia and Ecuador for anti-American behavior, and threatened to punish them should they offer asylum to Snowden. These threats could only cause confusion in sober minds, as every sovereign country retains the right to issue or deny asylum to whomever it pleases. In addition, the United States itself has a tradition of always offering political asylum to deserters of the secret services of other countries, especially in the case of the former Soviet Union and other ex-socialist countries. In those situations, the United States never gave any consideration to how those other countries might react—it considered the deserters sources of valuable information. As long as deserters have not had a criminal and murderous past, they can receive political asylum in any country that considers itself sovereign and can stand up to any pressure and blackmail. Meanwhile, the hysteria of some politicians, if the State Department or other institutions of the executive branch join it, can only accelerate the process of Snowden’s asylum. For any country he might ask will only be more willing to demonstrate its own sovereignty and dignity by standing up to a bully that tries to dictate conditions to it. In our particular case, political pressure on Russia and President Putin could turn out to be utterly counterproductive. I believe that Washington has enough levelheaded people to understand that fact, and correctly advise the White House. The administration will need sound advice, as many people in Congress fail to understand the consequences of their calls for punishment of sovereign countries or foreign political leaders that don’t dance to Washington’s tune. Judging by the latest exchange between Moscow and Washington, it appears that the executive branches of both countries will find adequate solutions to the Snowden situation without attacks on each other’s dignity and self-esteem. Russia and the United States are both Security Council members, and much hinges on their decisions, including a slew of common problems that make cooperation necessary. Yet the recent series of scandals has caused irreparable damage to the image and soft power of the United States. I do not know how soon this damage can be repaired. But gone are the days when Orwell was seen as a relic of the Cold War, as the all-powerful Leviathan of the security services has run away from all accountability to state and society. Today the world is looking at America—and its model for governance—with a more critical eye.

#### Aff causes a fight between the President and Congress before every deployment – destroys US diplomacy – turns softer power and allied coop

Michael A. Newton – 2012, Professor of the Practice of Law, Vanderbilt University Law School

Inadvertent Implications of the War Powers Resolution, Case Western Reserve Journal of International Law, vol 45, Fall 2012, [http://law.case.edu/journals/JIL/Documents/45CaseWResJIntlL1&2.10.Article.Newton.pdf](http://law.case.edu/journals/JIL/Documents/45CaseWResJIntlL1%262.10.Article.Newton.pdf)

The War Powers Resolution is an outdated and demonstrably irrelevant relic of a bygone era of American political life. Its vestigial remains nevertheless result in heated debates between the coordinate branches of the federal government. This is especially true in the modern era of uncertainty regarding the precise scope of international authority for the use of force. At the time of this writing, debate continues over the adoption of the crime of aggression in the Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court. Current texts require that trans-state aggression must be “manifest” in order to warrant criminal sanction.87 The function of the threshold is twofold. First, it implies a magnitude test by referring to the gravity and scale of the act of aggression. Second, by referring to the character, the threshold poses a qualitative requirement: the state use of force must be unambiguously illegal. This qualitative aspect is very important because there has been extensive debate on whether Article 2(4) of the UN Charter is dead or useless because of its complete indeterminacy.88 The prohibition arising from international law on the use of force is surrounded by a legal grey area of some significance. The scope of anticipatory self-defense and forcible rescue operations at this juncture as well as some forms of humanitarian intervention remain defensible but unclear under international law. 89 In all those cases, reasonable international lawyers may disagree about the current state of the law. It would be thoroughly unwise to try to clarify this grey area through the back door of the international criminal justice system, and it is my opinion that the International Criminal Court should avoid these murky waters. However, unresolved domestic debates over the War Powers Resolution run the risk of undermining the US posture in these diplomatic debates even as they weaken national resolve and undermine the efficiency of our deployed forces. The War Powers Resolution should be repealed and replaced with a more modern and flexible formulation that balances these important needs and helps to ensure a synergy between the coordinate branches of government and the forces in the field.

#### Squo solves international cooperation and mutual restraint – Obama Doctrine

Aziz 13 (Omer, graduate student at Cambridge University, is a researcher at the Center for International and Defense Policy at Queen’s University, “The Obama Doctrine's Second Term,” Project Syndicate, 2-5, <http://www.project-syndicate.org/blog/the-obama-doctrine-s-second-term--by-omer-aziz>)

The Obama Doctrine’s first term has been a remarkable success. After the $3 trillion boondoggle in Iraq, a failed nation-building mission in Afghanistan, and the incessant saber-rattling of the previous Administration, President Obama was able to reorient U.S. foreign policy in a more restrained and realistic direction. He did this in a number of ways. First, an end to large ground wars. As Defense Secretary Robert Gates put it in February 2011, anyone who advised future presidents to conduct massive ground operations ought “to have [their] head examined.” Second, a reliance on Secret Operations and drones to go after both members of al Qaeda and other terrorist outfits in Pakistan as well as East Africa. Third, a rebalancing of U.S. foreign policy towards the Asia-Pacific — a region neglected during George W. Bush's terms but one that possesses a majority of the world’s nuclear powers, half the world’s GDP, and tomorrow’s potential threats. Finally, under Obama's leadership, the United States has finally begun to ask allies to pick up the tab on some of their security costs. With the U.S. fiscal situation necessitating retrenchment, coupled with a lack of appetite on the part of the American public for foreign policy adventurism, Obama has begun the arduous process of burden-sharing necessary to maintain American strength at home and abroad. What this amounted to over the past four years was a vigorous and unilateral pursuit of narrow national interests and a multilateral pursuit of interests only indirectly affecting the United States. Turkey, a Western ally, is now leading the campaign against Bashar al-Assad’s regime in Syria. Japan, Korea, India, the Philippines, Myanmar, and Australia all now act as de facto balancers of an increasingly assertive China. With the withdrawal of two troop brigades from the continent, Europe is being asked to start looking after its own security. In other words, the days of free security and therefore, free riding, are now over. The results of a more restrained foreign policy are plentiful. Obama was able to assemble a diverse coalition of states to execute regime-change in Libya where there is now a moderate democratic government in place. Libya remains a democracy in transition, but the possibilities of self-government are ripe. What’s more, the United States was able to do it on the cheap. Iran’s enrichment program has been hampered by the clandestine cyber program codenamed Olympic Games. While Mullah Omar remains at large, al Qaeda’s leadership in Afghanistan and Pakistan has been virtually decimated. With China, the United States has maintained a policy of engagement and explicitly rejected a containment strategy, though there is now something resembling a cool war — not yet a cold war — as Noah Feldman of Harvard Law School puts it, between the two economic giants. The phrase that best describes the Obama Doctrine is one that was used by an anonymous Administration official during the Libya campaign and then picked up by Republicans as a talking point: Leading From Behind. The origin of the term dates not to weak-kneed Democratic orthodoxy but to Nelson Mandela, who wrote in his autobiography that true leadership often required navigating and dictating aims ‘from behind.’ The term, when applied to U.S. foreign policy, has a degree of metaphorical verity to it: Obama has led from behind the scenes in pursuing terrorists and militants, is shifting some of the prodigious expenses of international security to others, and has begun the U.S. pivot to the Asia-Pacific region. The Iraq War may seem to be a distant memory to many in North America, but its after-effects in the Middle East and Asia tarnished the United States' image abroad and rendered claims to moral superiority risible. Leading From Behind is the final nail in the coffin of the neoconservatives' failed imperial policies.

#### 1NC Soft power fails - empirics

Drezner 11

Daniel W. Drezner, Professor of International Politics at the Fletcher School of Law and Diplomacy at Tufts University, Foreign Affairs, July/August 2011, "Does Obama Have a Grand Strategy?", <http://www.foreignaffairs.com/print/67869>

What went wrong? The administration, and many others, erred in believing that improved standing would give the United States greater policy leverage. The United States' standing among foreign publics and elites did rebound. But this shift did not translate into an appreciable increase in the United States' soft power. Bargaining in the G-20 and the UN Security Council did not get any easier. Soft power, it turns out, cannot accomplish much in the absence of a willingness to use hard power. The other problem was that China, Russia, and other aspiring great powers did not view themselves as partners of the United States. Even allies saw the Obama administration's supposed modesty as a cover for shifting the burden of providing global public goods from the United States to the rest of the world. The administration's grand strategy was

#### Obama will resist the plan – fights over war powers create intractable national diversions and impairs military decision making

Lobel, Pittsburgh law professor, 2008

(Jules, “Conflicts Between the Commander in Chief and Congress: Concurrent Power over the Conduct of War”, Ohio State Law Journal, vol 69, lexis, ldg)

The critical difficulty with a contextual approach is its inherent ambiguity and lack of clarity, which tends to sharply shift the balance of power in favor of a strong President acting in disregard of congressional will. For example, the application of the Feldman and Issacharoff test asking whether the congressional restriction makes realistic sense in the modern world would yield no coherent separation of powers answer if applied to the current Administration’s confrontation with Congress. It would undoubtedly embolden the President to ignore Congress’s strictures**.** The President’s advisors would argue that the McCain Amendment’s ban on cruel and inhumane treatment, or FISA’s requirement of a warrant, does not make realistic sense in the context of the contemporary realities of the war on terror in which we face a shadowy, ruthless nonstate enemy that has no respect for laws or civilized conduct, a conclusion hotly disputed by those opposed to the President’s policies. Focusing the debate over whether Congress has the power to control the treatment of detainees on the President’s claim that the modern realities of warfare require a particular approach will merge the separation of powers inquiry of who has the power with the political determination of what the policy ought to be. Such an approach is likely to encourage the President to ignore and violate legislative wartime enactments whenever he or she believes that a statute does not make realistic sense—that is, when it conflicts with a policy the President embraces. 53 The contextual approach has a “zone of twilight” quality that Justice Jackson suggested in Youngstown. 54 Often constitutional norms matter less than political realities—**wartime reality often favors a strong President who will overwhelm** both Congress and the courts. While it is certainly correct— as Jackson noted—that neither the Court nor the Constitution will preserve separation of powers where Congress is too politically weak to assert its authority, a fluid contextual approach is an invitation to Presidents to push beyond the constitutional boundaries of their powers and ignore legislative enactments that seek to restrict their wartime authority. Moreover, another substantial problem with a contextual approach in the war powers context is that the judiciary is unlikely to resolve the dispute. 55 The persistent refusal of the judiciary to adjudicate the constitutionality of the War Powers Resolution strongly suggests that courts will often refuse to intervene to resolve disputes between the President and Congress over the constitutionality of a statute that a President claims impermissibly interferes with her conduct of an ongoing war. 56 This result leaves the political branches to engage in an intractable dispute over the statute’s constitutionality that saps the nation’s energy, diverts focus from the political issues in dispute, and endangers the rule of law. Additionally, in wartime it is often important for issues relating to the exercise of war powers to be resolved quickly. Prompt action is not usually the forte of the judiciary. If, however, a constitutional consensus exists or could be consolidated that Congress has the authority to check the President’s conduct of warfare, that consensus might help embolden future Congresses to assert their power. Such a consensus might also help prevent the crisis, chaos, and stalemate that may result when the two branches assert competing constitutional positions and, as a practical matter, judicial review is unavailable to resolve the dispute. Moreover, the adoption of a contextual, realist approach will undermine rather than aid the cooperation and compromise between the political branches that is so essential to success in wartime. In theory, an unclear, ambiguous division of power between the branches that leaves each branch uncertain of its legal authority could further compromise and cooperation. However, modern social science research suggests that the opposite occurs. 57 Each side in the dispute is likely to grasp onto aspects or factors within the ambiguous or complex reality to support its own self-serving position. This self-serving bias hardens each side’s position and allows the dispute to drag on, as has happened with the ongoing, unresolved dispute over the constitutionality of the War Powers Resolution. Pg. 407-409

### **UN**

#### UN fails – Kenny – not just US lacking support but global bodies overall – even if they improve the UN they make it just another arm of the US military which means the squo solves or it decks solvency

#### Saudi rejection makes decline inevitable and the U.N. fails

LAT 10/18, Los Angeles Times, <http://articles.latimes.com/2013/oct/18/world/la-fg-wn-saudi-arabia-united-nations-security-council-20131018>

A day after the United Nations elected Saudi Arabia to a prestigious seat on the Security Council, the Saudi leadership refused to accept the position and lashed out at the world body for "double standards" and failure to protect peace.

It was a stunning and unprecedented rebuke of the U.N. Security Council, diplomats and academics said, especially after the recent breakthrough in getting the unanimous approval of the 15-member council on a plan to rid Syria of its chemical weapons.

The Saudi ambassador to the United Nations, Abdallah al Mouallimi, on Thursday hailed [Riyadh's election](http://www.latimes.com.preview.tribdev.com/world/worldnow/la-fg-wn-un-security-council-saudi-arabia-chad-20131017%2C0%2C5200025.story) to a two-year stint on the Security Council as recognition of the country's "long-standing policy in support of moderation and in support of resolving disputes by peaceful means."

But on Friday, the Saudi Foreign Ministry announced that it was rejecting the seat and issued a bitter denunciation of the council's failure over 65 years to resolve the Israeli-Palestinian conflict and its refusal to ensure a Middle East free of weapons of mass destruction, an apparent reference to Israel, widely believed to have a nuclear arsenal.

"Allowing the ruling regime in Syria to kill and burn its people by the chemical weapons, while the world stands idly, without applying deterrent sanctions against the Damascus regime, is also irrefutable evidence and proof of the inability of the Security Council to carry out its duties and responsibilities," the Foreign Ministry said in a statement carried by the official [Saudi Press Agency](http://www.spa.gov.sa/English/index.php).

"Saudi Arabia believes that the manner, the mechanisms of action and double standards existing in the Security Council prevent it from performing its duties and assuming its responsibilities towards preserving international peace and security as required, leading to the continued disruption of peace and security, the expansion of the injustices against the peoples, the violation of rights and the spread of conflicts and wars around the world," the government said.

### Solvency

#### Neither the courts nor Congress want to play a role in authorizing war – they won’t enforce the aff

Gene Healy 2009 (vice president at the Cato Institute) “Reclaiming the War Power” http://object.cato.org/sites/cato.org/files/serials/files/cato-handbook-policymakers/2009/9/hb111-10.pdf

Each of these proposals has the merit of demanding that Congress carry the burden the Constitution places upon it: responsibility for the decision to go to war. The Gelb-Slaughter plan shows particular promise. Although Congress hasn’t declared war since 1942, reviving the formal declaration would make it harder for legislators to punt that decision to the president, as they did in Vietnam and Iraq. Hawks should see merit in making declarations mandatory, since a declaration commits those who voted for it to support the president and provide the resources he needs to prosecute the war successfully. Doves too should find much to applaud in the idea: forcing Congress to take a stand might concentrate the mind wonderfully and reduce the chances that we will find ourselves spending blood and treasure in conflicts that were not carefully examined at the outset. But we should be clear about the difficulties that comprehensive war powers reform entails. Each of these reforms presupposes a Congress eager to be held accountable for its decisions, a judiciary with a stomach for interbranch struggles, and a voting public that rewards political actors who fight to put the presidency in its place. Representative Jones’s Constitutional War Powers Resolution, which seeks to draw the judiciary into the struggle to constrain executive war making, ignores the Court’s resistance to congressional standing

, as well as the 30-year history of litigation under the War Powers Resolution, a history that shows how adept the federal judiciary is at constructing rationales that allow it to avoid picking sides in battles between Congress and the president. Even if Jones’s Constitutional War Powers Resolution or Ely’s Combat Authorization Act could be passed today, and even if the courts, defying most past practice, grew bold enough to rule on whether hostilities were imminent, there would be still another difficulty; as Ely put it: ‘‘When we got down to cases and a court remanded the issue to Congress, would Congress actually be able to follow through and face the issue whether the war in question should be permitted to proceed? Admittedly, the matter is not entirely free from doubt.’’ It’s worth thinking about how best to tie Ulysses to the mast. But the problem with legislative schemes designed to force Congress to ‘‘do the right thing’’ is that Congress seems always to have one hand free. Statutory schemes designed to precommit legislators to particular procedures do not have a terribly promising track record. Historically, many such schemes have proved little more effective than a dieter’s note on the refrigerator. No mere statute can truly bind a future Congress, and in areas ranging from agricultural policy to balanced budgets, Congress has rarely hesitated to undo past agreements in the pursuit of short-term political advantage. A : 14431$CH10 11-11-08 14:18:58 Page 113 Layout: 14431 : Odd 113 C ATO H ANDBOOK FOR P OLICYMAKERS If checks on executive power are to be restored, we will need far less Red Team–Blue Team politicking—and many more legislators than we currently have who are willing to put the Constitution ahead of party loyalty. That in turn will depend on a public willing to hold legislators accountable for ducking war powers fights and ceding vast authority to the president. Congressional courage of the kind needed to reclaim the war power will not be forthcoming unless and until American citizens demand it.

#### Aff is circumvented – plan does none of the things 1ac author says is key – and the WPR proves enforcement is not normal means, so it won’t exist if the aff doesn’t explicitly fiat it

Lobel – 1ac author – 9

Jules Lobel, Professor of Law at the University of Pittsburgh, “Restore. Protect. Expand. Amend the War Powers Resolution,” Center for Constitutional Rights White Paper, http://ccrjustice.org/files/CCR\_White\_WarPowers.pdf

Reform the War Powers Resolution The War Powers Resolution has failed. Every president since the enactment of the Act has considered it to be unconstitutional. Presidents have generally not filed a report that would start the 60-day clock running, despite repeated executive introduction of armed forces into places like Indochina, Iran, Lebanon, Central America, Grenada, Libya, Bosnia, Haiti, Kosovo and Somalia, among others. Congress has usually not challenged this non-compliance. And, the judiciary has persistently refused to adjudicate claims challenging executive action as violating the War Powers Resolution, holding that members of Congress have no standing to seek relief, or that the claim presents non-justifiable political questions. The War Powers Resolution, as written, was flawed in several key respects. The first flaw was that the Resolution imposed no operative, substantive limitations on the executive’s power to initiate warfare, but rather created a time limit of 60 days on the president’s use of troops in hostile situations without explicit congressional authorization. This approach was a mistake, because as a practical matter it recognized that the President could engage in unilateral war-making for up to 60 days, or 90 days with an extension. But the Constitution requires that Congress provide authorization prior to initiating non-defensive war, not within a period of months after warfare is initiated. As history has demonstrated time and again, it is difficult to terminate warfare once hostilities have begun. The key time for Congress to weigh in is before hostilities are commenced, not 60 or 90 days afterward. Secondly, the War Powers Resolution correctly recognized that even congressional silence, inaction or even implicit approval does not allow the president to engage in warfare – but it failed to provide an adequate enforcement mechanism if the president did so. Under the resolution, wars launched by the executive were supposed to be automatically terminated after 60 or 90 days if not affirmatively authorized by Congress – but this provision proved unenforceable. Presidents simply ignored it, Congress had an insufficient interest in enforcing it and the courts responded by effectually saying: if Congress did nothing, why should we?

**<AFF CARD STARTS>**

Reforming the War Powers Resolution is a project that will require leadership from the President and the political will of Congress, working together in the service and preservation of the Constitution. In light of the abuses that have taken place under the Bush administration, it is the responsibility of a new administration to insist on transparency in the drafting of new legislation. There is a long history of attempts to revise the War Powers Resolution. As new legislation is drafted, though, it will be important to focus on the central constitutional issues. Much time has been spent in debating how to address contingencies. It will be impossible to write into law any comprehensive formula for every conceivable situation, though; much more important will be establishing the fundamental principles of reform: The War Powers Resolution should explicitly prohibit executive acts of war without previous Congressional authorization. The only exception should be the executive’s power in an emergency to use short-term force to repel sudden attacks on US territories, troops or citizens. It is true that many potential conflict situations will be murky, complicated or divisive, and that quick congressional action may not always be forthcoming. Yet, history shows the folly of launching wars that are not supported by the American people. The United States should not use military force until a substantial consensus develops in Congress and the public that military force is necessary, appropriate and wise. Today, as in 1787, the reality is that the interests of the people of the United States are best served if the Congress retains the power to declare war, and the President’s unilateral power to use American forces in combat should be reserved to repelling attacks on American troops or territories and evacuating citizens under actual attack. Repelling does not equate retaliation for an attack on an American city that occurred in the past, be it several days, weeks or months prior; it also does not mean launching a surprise invasion of a nation that has not attacked us. Repelling similarly does not permit the inflation of supposed threats against US citizens as justification to invade another country, as was the case in the Dominican Republic in 1965 and Grenada in 1983. The president can respond defensively to attacks that have been launched or are in the process of being launched, but not to rumors, reports, intuitions, or warnings of attacks. Preventive war, disguised as preemptive war, has no place in constitutional or international law. To ensure that this principle is enforced, new legislation should prohibit the use of appropriated funds for any executive use of force that is unauthorized under the statute. Furthermore, the reformed War Powers Resolution must allow room for judicial oversight in the case of conflicts. A president who initiates hostilities in disregard of the statute would undoubtedly use appropriated funds to do so, forcing Congress to make the difficult decision of whether to authorize funds for troops engaged in combat. The statute should therefore state that a presidential violation of the act would create an impasse with Congress, and that separation of powers principles require the Court to decide the merits of any challenge brought against an alleged violation. And, a presidential violation of this principle should be explicitly made an impeachable offense.

### Solvency 2NC – Congress Won’t Enforce

#### The aff is just an ex ante version of the WPR—it will fail for all the same reasons

**Druck ‘12** [Judah A. Druck, law associate at Sullivan & Cromwell LLP, Cornell Law School graduate, magna cum laude graduate from Brandeis University, “Droning On: The War Powers Resolution and the Numbing Effect of Technology-Driven Warfare,” <http://www.lawschool.cornell.edu/research/cornell-law-review/upload/Druck-final.pdf>]

Of course, despite these various suits, Congress has received¶ much of the blame for the WPR’s treatment and failures. For example, Congress has been criticized for doing little to enforce the WPR¶ in using other Article I tools, such as the “power of the purse,”76 or by¶ closing the loopholes frequently used by presidents to avoid the WPR in the first place.77 Furthermore, in those situations where Congress¶ has decided to act, it has done so in such a disjointed manner as to¶ render any possible check on the President useless. For example, during President Reagan’s invasion of Grenada, Congress failed to reach¶ an agreement to declare the WPR’s sixty-day clock operative,78 and¶ later faced similar “deadlock” in deciding how best to respond to President Reagan’s actions in the Persian Gulf, eventually settling for a bill¶ that reflected congressional “ambivalence.”79 Thus, between the **lack**¶ **of a “backbone**” to check rogue presidential action and **general ineptitude** when it actually decides to act, Congress has demonstrated its¶ inability to remedy WPR violations.¶ Worse yet, much of Congress’s interest in the WPR is politically¶ motivated, leading to inconsistent review of presidential military decisions filled with post-hoc rationalizations. Given the political risk associated with wartime decisions,81 Congress **lacks any incentive to act**¶ unless and until it can gauge public reaction—a process that often¶ occurs after the fact.82 As a result, missions deemed successful by the¶ public will rarely provoke “serious congressional concern” about presidential compliance with the WPR, while failures will draw scrutiny.83¶ For example, in the case of the Mayaguez, “liberals in the Congress¶ generally praised [President Gerald Ford’s] performance” despite the¶ constitutional questions surrounding the conflict, simply because the public deemed it a success.84 Thus, even if Congress was effective at¶ checking potentially unconstitutional presidential action, it would only act when politically safe to do so. This result should be unsurprising: making a wartime decision provides little advantage for politicians, especially if the resulting action succeeds.85 Consequently,¶ Congress itself has taken a role in the continued disregard for WPR¶ enforcement.¶ The current WPR framework is broken: presidents avoid it, courts¶ will not rule on it, and Congress will not enforce it. This cycle has¶ culminated in President Obama’s recent use of force in Libya, which¶ created little, if any, controversy,86 and it provides a clear pass to future presidents, judges, and congresspersons looking to continue the¶ system of passivity and deferment.

# 1NR

**China**

**China’s rise will be peaceful --- integration makes hegemonic competition impossible --- Chinese policymakers don’t support expansion**

**Wanandi 4/1, Vice Chairman of Trustees at CSIS**, Insight: China’s peaceful rise, community of nations: Zheng Bijan’s strategy, <http://www.thejakartapost.com/news/2013/04/01/insight-china-s-peaceful-rise-community-nations-zheng-bijian-s-strategy.html>

**The peaceful rise of a China based on shared interests with other powers**, big and small, **was an idea proposed by Zheng Bijian** some years ago that has been **adopted as strategy by the Chinese leadership in preparing future policies**. Zheng, one of China’s great strategists, understood that China could not follow the trajectory that Western countries had followed in the last century. He said that what China had to avoid was embarking on an old strategy that was no longer valid for the future, such as happened in Europe at the end of the 19th century, which resulted in the outbreak of World War I. China had to remain free of power politics, the Cold War and hegemonic competition. As we are experiencing today, elements of competition exist, but so do **elements of cooperation and coordination in big-power relations, making the idea of hegemonic competition almost impossible. Economic interdependence and**, to a certain extent, **global and regional integration have prevented that from happening**. In addition, developing nations have developed and modernized, becoming an important part of the world and making hegemonic economic dominance impossible for the last half decade. **For China, which might become the world’s biggest economy by GDP in the next 10 years or so, its biggest challenges will be how to behave and how its role should be formulated as a big economic power**. In this effort, China must also take huge domestic problems into consideration, as well as its dependence on natural resources, energy and advanced technology. **China has no ambitions to become a global superpower, because it recognizes its limitations and willingness to run other parts of the world. This has never been an ambition of China throughout history. China has always been big. Its ambition is mainly to be recognized by others, and not to run over or to subdue others**. Admittedly, Southeast Asia or ASEAN’s member nations have their differences in their respective policies toward China. However, in general, the region accepts that China is an important and strategic partner and that economically China is and will become more important. Historically, China has always been accepted and recognized as an important country in the region, and the region has to pay attention to the nation. **If hegemony is almost impossible, then China’s peaceful rise has to be taken as the best strategy for China and for the region. A peaceful rise in connection with regional institutions might be just the right strategy for China and the East Asian region, because they share common interests, although strengthening bilateral relations is also of paramount importance**.

the region.

**2nc Farm Bill**

**Economic decline causes extinction and turns multilat**

Cesare **Merlini 11**, nonresident senior fellow at the Center on the United States and Europe and chairman of the Board of Trustees of the Italian Institute for International Affairs, May 2011, “A Post-Secular World?”, Survival, Vol. 53, No. 2

Two neatly opposed scenarios for the future of the world order illustrate the range of possibilities, albeit at the risk of oversimplification. The first scenario entails the premature crumbling of the post-Westphalian system. **One or more of the acute tensions apparent today evolves into** an open and **traditional conflict between states, perhaps** even **involving the use of nuclear weapons. The crisis might be triggered by a collapse of the global economic and financial system**, the vulnerability of which we have just experienced, **and the prospect of a second Great Depression, with consequences for peace and democracy similar to those of the first**. Whatever the trigger, **the unlimited exercise of national sovereignty, exclusive self-interest and rejection of outside interference** would self-interest and rejection of outside interference **would** likely **be amplified, emptying**, perhaps entirely, the half-full glass of **multilateralism**, including the UN and the European Union. Many of the more likely conflicts, such as between Israel and Iran or India and Pakistan, have potential religious dimensions. Short of war, tensions such as those related to immigration might become unbearable. F**amiliar issues of creed and identity could be exacerbated**. One way or another, the **secular rational approach would be sidestepped by a return to theocratic absolutes**, competing or **converging with** secular absolutes such as **unbridled nationalism**.

**Concede it’s key to forests --- extinction**

**NRDC 7** – largest US environmental action group of over a million members (Good Wood: How Forest Certification Helps the Environment, http://www.nrdc.org/land/forests/qcert.asp, AG)

Forests are more than a symbolic ideal of wilderness, more than quiet places to enjoy nature. **Forest ecosystems** -trees, soil, undergrowth, all living things in a forest -**are critical to maintaining life on earth. Forests help us breathe by creating oxygen and filtering pollutants** from the air, and help stabilize the global climate by absorbing carbon dioxide, the main greenhouse gas. **They soak up rainfall** like giant sponges, **preventing floods and** purifying water that we drink. They **provide habitat for 90 percent of the plant and animal species** that live on land, as well as homelands for many of the earth's last remaining indigenous cultures. Forests are commercially important, too; they yield valuable resources like wood, rubber and medicinal plants, including plants used to create cancer drugs. Harvesting these resources provides employment for local communities. Healthy forests are a critical part of the web of life. Yet more than half of the earth's original forest cover has been destroyed due to human activity such as agriculture, development and logging. Much of the loss has occurred within the past three decades. Protecting the earth's remaining forest cover is now an urgent task.

### 2nc AT: Resilient

#### Persistent leadership by Obama key to secure a fair and just farm bill --- just extending the 2008 farm bill again fails farmers

Clayton, 11/5 --- Former Congresswoman and former Assistant Director General of the UN Food and Agriculture Organization (11/5/2013, Eva M., “Congressional and Presidential Leadership Needed for a Fair and Equitable Farm Bill,” <http://www.huffingtonpost.com/eva-m-clayton/congressional-and-presidential_b_4221884.html>))

Will Congress and the president demonstrate the leadership necessary to enact a strong, but fair Farm Bill that protects our agricultural economy and rural communities? Will it provide a "safety net" for our most vulnerable citizens? Hopefully, the appointed Conferees will seek an opportunity to pass a strong Farm Bill that is fair and helpful to small and large farmers and will enable them to produce healthy and affordable food. The Farm Bill should empower our rural communities to develop and grow economically. Likewise, it must protect and provide food assistance to the millions of Americans in need.

The leadership in the U.S. House of Representatives and the Senate must instruct the Conferees to negotiate in the best interest of the American people. President Obama must be persistent in his leadership by calling on Congress to treat our most vulnerable citizens fairly, protect small and large farmers, and give rural communities an opportunity to grow economically. Another extension of the Farm Bill once again is unacceptable. Farmers and businesses, which have been devastated by the legislative uncertainty, are unable to plan for the next planting season, and cannot do so until Congress acts and the president signs a bill. This delay has hampered assistance for early generation farmers, minority farmers, and the rural small business sector who all suffer disproportionately without a signed bill.

The Fair World Project reports that the majority of farm subsidies are paid to the most profitable companies in the U.S. and "ten percent of farms receive roughly 70 percent of all subsidies." This oversized government benefit reaped by large farms is a major factor in their ability to further expand, leading to increased concentration in the agriculture sector. These subsidies often drive land costs up and small farmers out. Yet, the conversation continues to be focused on cutting the Supplemental Nutrition Assistance Program (SNAP). This political gamesmanship puts us again at the crossroads of the "haves and have not's," while too many Americans depend on SNAP for it to be cut in the final bill.

The House-passed Farm Bill cut $40 Billion over a ten-year period, mainly by cutting SNAP. The Tea Party and the extreme right wing of the Republican Party might see this as important part of its agenda to "cut spending," but such actions by the House have only resulted in ending 34 years of bipartisan cooperation on food and farm legislation. While Republicans in Congress continue to attack the Food Stamps program as an "easy place" to cut, they fail to recognize the needs of their own constituents and the contribution it provides our economy.

Some fail to acknowledge, understand, or care that we had a recession and that Food Stamps were a part of the American Recovery and Reinvestment Act of 2009. This bill, known as the 'Stimulus Package,' was scheduled to end November 1, 2013 and resulted in millions of people being dropped from the program. According to the Center on Budget and Policy Priorities (CBPP), ending the Recovery Act will reduce benefits to approximately $1.40 per person per meal in 2014. Just think $1.40 per meal! Further, the vast majority of the 47 million SNAP recipients are children, seniors, and adults with disabilities.

SNAP can be the bridge between living and survival, dignity and embarrassment. In fact over 900,000 veterans and 5,000 active duty service personnel currently receive food stamps. An example of this hardship was chronicled by the Food and Environment Reporting Network. Steven Johnson, a veteran of the war in Afghanistan, was medically discharged from the military and was unable to find work as a result of his disability. To further complicate matters, there was significant lag time between the end of his military pay and the beginning of his disability benefits. The typical wait time for this benefit is 394 days for active duty veterans, and longer for non-active duty personnel. That is 394 days without a pay check. 394 days without the capacity to feed yourself or your family. To bridge this gap, Johnson relied on food stamps to help feed his family. As veteran Johnson said, "Food Stamps were the last resort we had." This is what is at stake for the Confrees and this President.

Unfortunately, there have been anecdotal comments of fraud where "people are trading food stamps for cash." While these instances must be addressed, but it is simply unfair to use these anecdotes to characterize how the law functions. The Department of Agriculture has reported that as few as 1.3 percent of all benefits, were traded at a discount for cash. I agree that fraud is unacceptable concerning all government programs and laws. However, it is amazing how offensive it is for Republicans to use assistance for the poor as a political piñata when fraud persists on Wall Street or among big businesses.

The Fair World Project rightly notes that the "Farm Bill is the single most important piece of legislation affecting the food we eat, the kinds of crops American farmers grow, and the environment in which they are grown. The Farm Bill is at the very essence of our nation's food security." This could not be more accurate.

The Conferees must put our country first to find success in their negotiations. A strong and fair Farm Bill will require Congressional and presidential leadership. The fate of our nation's food security depends on it.

**New farm bill key to prevent a food price spike – massive economic damage**

**NELSON 10 – 17 – 13 Staff Writer** [Joe Nelson, Obama, ag industry waiting for new Farm bill, http://www.weau.com/home/headlines/Obama-ag-industry-waiting-for-new-Farm-Bill-228259521.html]

With the government shutdown over, **farmers are** still **waiting** for a deal to be made.

President **Obama listed the farm bill as one of his top priorities** to address, which could protect farmers and low income families.

“We should pass a farm bill, one that American farmers and ranchers can depend on, one that protects vulnerable children and adults in times of need, one that gives rural communities opportunities to grow and the long-term certainty that they deserve. Again, the Senate's already passed a solid bipartisan bill. It's got support from democrats and republicans. It's sitting in the House waiting for passage. If House republicans have ideas that they think would improve the farm bill, let's see them. Let's negotiate. What are we waiting for? Let's get this done,” Obama said.

**Farmers said if they struggle without a farm bill, it could cause food prices to spike**, **force some out of the industry and damage the economy.**

“**If the milk price falls** below a certain level, **the Farm bill does help support farmers** during a time of an economic crisis when prices drop too low,” Chippewa County U.W. Extension Crops and Soils Educator, Jerry **Clark**

The current, five-year Farm bill was temporarily extended, but both farmers and Clark said with much to lose, **a new one is needed.**

“**Any time we can get the new bill passed, it's definitely going to help** because there's always new changes in agriculture, as far as commodities or practices that need to be implemented,” Clark said. “So those types of things should be passed to keep up with the current trends in agriculture.

Durand corn and soybean farmer and Value Implement dealer TJ Poeschel says **not having a new farm bill and reverting** to a bill from 1949 **could cut down profits** or even **force some farmers to quit** or retire.

**2nc Uniqueness**

**Momentum now --- can be concluded this year**

**Rogers, 11/14** (David, 11/14/2013, “Republicans more optimistic on farm bill,” [www.politico.com/story/2013/11/republicans-farm-bill-99889.html?hp=l5)](http://www.politico.com/story/2013/11/republicans-farm-bill-99889.html?hp=l5)))

**House Republicans were more upbeat Thursday on getting a farm bill done this year**, with Speaker John Boehner raising the subject and **Agriculture Committee Chairman** Frank **Lucas saying he and his Senate counterparts are “getting to a common point on the commodity title.”**

“I can say that all the face-to-face meetings that have gone on with the principals — in the last couple of weeks — have made progress,” Lucas told POLITICO. “We are getting to a common point on the commodity title.”

“There are still some big principles: choice vs. all inclusive, how you calculate the acres. But **we are moving and staff on a variety of fronts are ironing out the differences.**”

Talks between the Oklahoma Republican and Senate Agriculture Committee Chairwoman Debbie Stabenow (D-Mich.) are expected to continue late Thursday. And at his weekly news conference Thursday morning, **Boehner included the farm bill as part of his year-end agenda**.

**“There are issues that can be resolved before the end of the year, including reforms to our farm programs**, a bill to reauthorize important water projects around the country and hopefully a budget agreement so that we can stop lurching from one crisis to another,” the speaker told reporters. “We have got a chance to find common ground, and **I am hopeful that we can make progress on** all of **these issues**.”

**Obama committed to getting it done this year --- branding it as a pro-economy bill**

**Hopkinson, 11/14** (Jenny, 11/14/2013, “ Tom Vilsack: More than agriculture at stake in farm bill,” <http://www.politico.com/story/2013/11/pro-agriculture-launch-99874.html>))

**\*\*\*Note --- Vilsack is Agriculture Secretary**

During his remarks, **Vilsack reiterated the Obama administration’s commitment to finalizing the farm bill by the end of the year; both chambers are working in conference committee to reconcile their versions of the bill.**

**“It’s more than a farm bill,”** Vilsack said. **“It’s a jobs bill, it’s the opportunity for us to invest in business development in rural America to take advantage of our natural resources. … It’s an energy bill … it’s a trade bill, it’s a reform bill … and it will help to reduce the deficit.”**

What’s more, he added, “I think there is a link to it getting done and the Congress getting to important work on the budget.”

But **reaching an agreement will be difficult as lawmakers continue to tussle over contentious provisions**, the biggest of which is language to cuts the Supplemental Nutrition Assistance Program. While the House bill would cut almost $40 billion from the food aid program over 10 years, the Senate version only calls for a $4 billion reduction over that period.

Vilsack declined to provide a dollar figure that the administration would be happy with, saying only, “There’s too much fascination and focus on numbers in this town, I think we need to focus on the policy.”

**Can pass with solid bipartisan support [--- Obama is aggressively pushing]**

**Mishra, 11/6** (Saran --- City Editor, 11/6/2013, “Failure to pass farm bill could have tremendous impact on local farmers,” http://www.purdueexponent.org/city\_state/article\_a61af535-5c39-5d10-9df9-9c85fb1bfd1b.html))

Since September, America has been lacking a proper farm bill and consequently a proper federal agricultural and food policy.

President Barack **Obama identified three main priorities he would like resolutions for** by the end of the year following the government shutdown in October: **Immigration reform, a budget agreement and a new farm bill**. The farm bill would be passed for a five-year period.

The bill once again will be divided into two components: a nutrition program and an agricultural element. The two components have caused controversy, with House Republicans wanting to tighten eligibility rules for those receiving nutrition assistance and the administration threatening to cut “direct payment” subsidies to farmers and cut back federal subsidies for crop insurance.

“That’s one of the issues that will come up in conference,” said Christopher **Hurt, a professor in the College of Agriculture**. “Do we need two bills? One a farm bill and the other a nutrition bill.”

Hurt said the agriculture part of the farm bill is so small that it barely gets any recognition in Congress.

“It could be the death of any kind of major support for the agricultural sector,” Hurt said. He identified the few areas that need to be covered by the new farm bill — safety nets for farmers, price supports for goods and land conservation compliance linked with the direct payments to farmers.

“The farming sector has wide swings in their financial well beings ... if you remember last year, in Indiana, there were terrible droughts and families who have spent multiple generations on a farm can lose huge amounts of equity in a year,” he added.

However, farmers in the local area remain divided on a bill being passed.

Pat Boyd, a small local farmer who vends his produce at the Purdue Farmer’s Market and owns around 25 acres, said he doesn’t want any governmental assistance.

“If I can’t do it on my own, I’ll go do something else,” he said. “ I don’t believe in the welfare system.”

However, Janet Glover, the head farmer at the organic Lone Balsam Farm in Russiaville, Ind. said a reformed farm bill should target the disparities between direct payment subsidies for large and small farms

“If the small farms, the organic or local farmers got the same subsidies ... then organic would be cheaper because the inputs into organic agriculture is especially expensive,” Glover said.

Though direct payments may go away, the money from those payments will be added to the safety net or the crop insurance and price supports according to Hurt. He identified a major talking point as being conservation of farm land.

“Will Congress tie getting subsidies on crop insurance to ‘you must meet conservation standards’? From a taxpayer’s standpoint, that sounds pretty reasonable to me,” Hurt said. **He believes that the bill could pass with a solid amount of bipartisanship.**

**Obama has demanded that Republicans come to the table on the issue. “If House Republicans have ideas that they think would improve the farm bill, let’s see them. Let’s negotiate**. What are we waiting for? Let’s get this done.”

**Will pass --- stars are aligning**

**Peterson, 11/15** (Erick, 11/15/2013, “Former ag director outlines opportunities, challenges,” <http://www.capitalpress.com/article/20131115/ARTICLE/131119920>))

**\*\*\*Note --- He is Dan Newhouse is the former Department of Agriculture director for Washington state**

**He is** similarly **disappointed by the Congress not passing a farm bill, but hopes that one will pass this year.**

**“The stars are lining up,” he said of the prospects for passage.**

**--- XT: Compromise on Farm Bill**

**Framework for compromise could emerge by next week**

**Wasson & Berman, 11/14** (Erik Wasson and Russell Berman, 11/14/2013, “Boehner to Ryan: Hands off farm bill,” <http://thehill.com/blogs/on-the-money/agriculture/190256-boehner-no-farm-bill-savings-in-budget-deal>)

At his stage, **farm bill talks appear to be moving along faster than any budget deal**.

Rep. Collin **Peterson** (Minn.), **who leads the House Democrats on the farm bill conference, said a framework deal could emerge next week**, even though both sides are struggling to resolve a $33 billion difference in the size of food stamp cuts in the farm bill.

**AT: No SNAP Agreement / Won’t Meet Thanksgiving Deadline**

**SNAP will be resolved**

**Hopkinson, 11/15** (Jenny, 11/15/2013, “Vilsack pans farm bill COOL provision — Farm bill unlikely before December — CBO: Tweaks to ag programs could save billions,” <http://www.politico.com/morningagriculture/1113/morningagriculture12238.html>))

FARM BILL WATCH — UNLIKELY BEFORE DECEMBER EDITION: It seems agreement on a consolidated farm bill may not happen in time to make the conference leaders’ end of November deadline, based on the comments of **Rep.** Jim **McGovern** (D-Mass) **during his Pro Ag launch interview with Editor Jason Huffman. “I don’t know if we will get it before thanksgiving but I think we will get one,”** McGovern said, **when pressed on timing. He added**, however, **“There is a desire to get this thing done.”**

It should be no shock that **the biggest issue holding up an agreement is the nutrition title**, where lawmakers must reconcile a $36 billion difference between the two measures. Though McGovern, one of the biggest defenders of SNAP, implied there was a little room for compromise, Rep. Steve **King** (R-Iowa) **told Pro’s Tarini Parti “at this point I don’t think there is progress made on nutrition.”** **But King also said the less controversial issues are being addressed first by both staff and lawmakers before the bigger issues are tackled.**

**Renewed push could make this time different --- Obama priority**

**Buck, 11/11** --- Buck is the president of the Minnesota Corn Growers Association (Ryan, Agweek, 11/11/2013, “It's time to pass a farm bill’ Partisan blocks need to end,” <http://www.agweek.com/event/article/id/22038/>))

During remarks on the Senate floor recently, Minnesota Sen. Amy Klobuchar recalled a phone conservation she had with Greg Schwarz, one of my fellow Minnesota corn farmers, about the farm bill.

“Farmers are working around the clock on this year’s harvest,” Klobuchar recalled Schwarz telling her recently from his combine on his farm near Le Sueur, Minn. “If you don’t hear from us, it’s not because we don’t care, it’s because we have work to do.”

What was once a symbol of bi-partisanship and legislation that connected farmers in rural America with consumers in the big city has devolved into yet another political mess in Washington. **Farmers have been trying to get a farm bill passed for more than two years now, and have run into partisan roadblock after partisan roadblock at every turn.**

**Recently, however, there has been a renewed push to pass a farm bill.** And just as farmers are doing the work necessary to finish this year’s harvest, **it’s time for our elected leaders in Washington to do the same and finally get their jobs done by passing a farm bill**.

President **Obama himself even made passing a farm bill one of his** top three **priorities** after the recent government shutdown ended.

**AT: PC Not Key**

#### Pub pressure---denin

#### Snap negotiations --- full risk b/c conceded

#### Your ev agrees!

Politico, 11-6-2013 <http://www.politico.com/story/2013/11/the-farm-bill-a-dickens-tale-99457.html>

At the opening session of the House-Senate farm bill conference last week, both parties put the best light on the prospects for a deal this year. Peterson and Lucas cut short their recess to resume talks Wednesday. But there’s no denying the gap over food stamp funding is huge.¶ In writing her farm bill, Senate Agriculture Committee Chairwoman Debbie Stabenow (D-Mich.) came in low, proposing just $4 billion in 10 year SNAP savings. And it was always assumed that she could at least double that in conference by cracking down harder on the so-called “heat-and-eat” schemes used by states to pump up SNAP benefit levels at federal expense.¶ But to get a deal, more will likely be needed now. Floor votes in the House in September pushed the whole nutrition debate dramatically to the right, doubling the level of SNAP savings from what Lucas had first proposed in June to what’s now $39 billion over 10 years.¶ Peterson suggested last week that SNAP is one area where President Barack Obama could be useful in brokering a deal which Democrats could accept. Stabenow was decidedly cool to that idea Tuesday in a short interview with POLITICO. And at a time when food stamp benefits are already being cut –because of prior legislation—the Michigan Democrat is defiant and draws a parallel between SNAP and crop insurance.

**Best line says “Stabenow was cool to that idea”….SO WHAT? Zero impact or conclusiveness in the 2ac means Margaret shouldn’t get to blow it up in the 1ar**

**Obama’s approval key to maintain party unity and sustain agenda**

**Levy, 11/15** (Pema, 11/15/2013, Newsweek, “Can He Rebound?” Factiva))

Nevertheless, **the stakes for Obama over the next few months are high. His poll numbers themselves may not move mountains, but they are essential to what has been his greatest legislative advantage: party unity. "Your own party members who are up in the midterm elections grow more and more nervous about being identified with you, and they begin to vote in ways that undermine your policies," Ornstein said.**

"We don't know where this will go," he added. "What matters is getting the Affordable Care Act up and running right now."

**AT: Thumpers**

**Farm bill is the top priority and the next two weeks are key**

**Eubank, 11/10** (Andy, 11/10/2013, “Farm Bill at Top of President’s Idea List in New Orleans,” <http://www.hoosieragtoday.com/farm-bill-at-top-of-presidents-idea-list-in-new-orleans/>))

**Speaking on the economy** in New Orleans Friday – President Barack **Obama again addressed three things he believes Republicans and Democrats can join together to do to make progress in the area of business growth and job creation right now. The farm bill was first on his list.** President **Obama said Congress needs to pass a farm bill that helps rural communities grow and protects vulnerable Americans.** Stressing that the farm bill doesn’t just benefit farmers – **the President called on Congress to do the right thing and pass a farm bill. The two weeks** ahead of Thanksgiving **could determine if Congress will get that done yet this year.** The House and Senate will both be in session before taking a Thanksgiving break that is scheduled to begin November 22nd. Congressional aides have suggested that recess will last two weeks. That schedule would have members returning December 9th for another two week session before an NewOrleansNightLifeexpected December 20th departure for the Christmas and New Year’s holidays. The farm bills approved by the House and Senate will not expire at the end of the year since the congressional session continues – but the pressure is on to finish a farm bill by then.

**--- XT: Top Priority**

**Farm bill is high priority for Obama**

**Hopkinson, 11/15** (Jenny, 11/15/2013, “Vilsack pans farm bill COOL provision — Farm bill unlikely before December — CBO: Tweaks to ag programs could save billions,” <http://www.politico.com/morningagriculture/1113/morningagriculture12238.html>))

A LOT ON THE AG SECRETARY’S MIND: Tom Vilsack was given his first chance to fire back at the House members in the farm bill conference who have suggested gutting the country-of-origin labeling law so as to not confront trade issues with Canada and Mexico at yesterday’s POLITICO Pro Agriculture event. It would set a bad precedent, he said, if “every time there is a trade discussion, folks can run to Congress and get the rules changed in the middle of the game, and I think we need to let the game play out,

Pro’s Bill Tomson took Vilsack through a slew of topics on the ag secretary’s mind, also including a battle over proposed cuts to the Supplemental Nutrition Assistance Program and whether the administration still supports ethanol. But **Vilsack was clear about one thing: the farm bill is a high priority for the administration.**

**“It’s more than a farm bill,”** he said. **“It’s a jobs bill; it’s the opportunity for us to invest in business development in rural America to take advantage of our natural resources. … It’s an energy bill … it’s a trade bill, it’s a reform bill … and it will help to reduce the deficit.”** What’s more, he added, “I think there is a link to it getting done and the Congress getting to important work on the budget.” The story on Vilsacks comments from the launch event is available here: http://politi.co/17t0rV5.

The full recording of the event is here: http://politi.co/1bI4hMF

**More evidence farm bill is top priority**

**Hopkinson, 11/11** (Jenny, 11/11/2013, “COOL rules under fire in farm bill — Obama names farm bill as top priority, again — Pew delivers report on GRAS,”

OBAMA: FARM BILL TOP PRIORITY: President **Obama** on Friday, **in a speech on exports** at the Port of the New Orleans, **reiterated his calls for the farm bill to be Congress’ number one priority now. “Congress needs to pass a farm bill that helps rural communities grow and protects vulnerable Americans,” Obama said.** “For decades, Congress found a way to compromise and pass farm bills without fuss. For some reason, now Congress can't even get that done. Now, this is not something that just benefits farmers. Ports like this one depend on all the products coming down the Mississippi. So let’s do the right thing, pass a farm bill. We can start selling more products. That's more business for this port. And that means more jobs right here.”

#### Their ev not conclusive

**PC Theory True**

#### Issues spill over FOR WAR POWERS --- it’s so contentious it guarantees massive backlash --- empirically spills over

**Political capital is key to switching votes**

**Kuttner 11 (Robert, Senior Fellow – Demos and Co-editor – American Prospect, “Barack Obama's Theory of Power,” The American Prospect, 5-16, http://prospect.org/cs/articles?article=barack\_obamas\_theory\_of\_power)**

As the political scientist Richard Neustadt observed in his classic work, Presidential Power, a book that had great influence on President John F. Kennedy, **the essence of a president's power is "the power to persuade."** Because our divided constitutional system does not allow the president to lead by commanding, presidents amass power by making strategic choices about when to use the latent authority of the presidency to move public and elite opinion and then use that added prestige as clout to move Congress. In one of Neustadt's classic case studies, Harry Truman, a president widely considered a lame duck, nonetheless persuaded the broad public and a Republican Congress in 1947-1948 that the Marshall Plan was a worthy idea. As Neustadt and Burns both observed, though an American chief executive is weak by constitutional design, **a president possesses several points of leverage**. He can play an effective outside game, motivating and shaping public sentiment, making clear the differences between his values and those of his opposition, and **using popular support to box in his opponents and move them in his direction**. He can complement the outside bully pulpit with a nimble inside game, uniting his legislative party, bestowing or withholding benefits on opposition legislators, forcing them to take awkward votes, and using the veto. He can also enlist the support of interest groups to pressure Congress, and use media to validate his framing of choices. Done well, all of this signals leadership that often moves the public agenda.

**Empirically true**

**Grumet, president of the Bipartisan Policy Center, 9/22 (9/22/2011, Jason, “"Pass this bill" - rebalancing the Administration's relationship with Congress,”** [**http://thehill.com/blogs/congress-blog/politics/183315-qpass-this-billq-rebalancing-the-administrations-relationship-with-congress**](http://thehill.com/blogs/congress-blog/politics/183315-qpass-this-billq-rebalancing-the-administrations-relationship-with-congress)**, JMP)**

**To date, the Obama Administration has largely presented Congress with legislative principles and worked behind the scenes as legislation is developed.** There are surely many reasons for the Obama Administration’s approach to Congress. At the outset of his Administration, Democrats controlled both Houses of Congress. On health care, the memories of President Clinton’s assertive approach surely played a role. Moreover, **the political capital expended to pass the Affordable Care Act clearly created some reluctance to push Congressional Democrats too hard on other issues.** But it is hard to argue that the Administration received, much if any, political protection through its greater deference to Congress.

**Issues aren’t compartmentalized – policy failures prevent future legislative successes – political capital is key to overcome opposition**

**Silber 7 – Political Science phd Student at UF (November 2007, Marissa, “What makes a president quack? Understanding lame duck status through the eyes of the media and politicians”, from paper Prepared for delivery at the 2007 Annual Meeting of the American Political Science Association, August 30th-September 2nd 2007, http://74.125.155.132/scholar?q=cache:bbkJmVQ3SJMJ:scholar.google.com/+%22political+capital%22+%22finite%22+resources+president&hl=en&as\_sdt=80000000) MGM**

Political capital, based on external resources “determines whether the President will have the opportunity to offer a detailed domestic program, whether he will be restricted to a series of limited initiatives and vetoes” according to Light (34). A President’s political capital determines the size and parameters of his agenda. Capital is based on external sources such as party support in Congress, public approval and electoral margin, and reputation. Capital reflects a President’s strength; low levels of political capital make it difficult for a President to get anything done.

A lame duck President is plagued by past policy failures, while not benefiting as much from policy successes (Dunn 2006). George Bush has been plagued by his lack of response to Hurricane Katrina and first term foreign policies after 9/11 to deal with the War on Terrorism (Dunn 2006). Past Presidents have also been plagued by both domestic and foreign policy failures, affecting both party and public support.

Party support is the chief ingredient in Presidential capital; even if public approval ratings go down, a President can still succeed if he has party support. Although congressional support does not guarantee victories on crucial votes, it helps more than public support (Light 27). The following example seems to suggest the importance of political capital and congressional support needed for a second-term President. Sundquist (1973) explores the loss of Presidential control over congress occurring when a President is a lame duck. Using the example of Dwight D. Eisenhower, he describes the “jockeying” that occurs among parties in congress. In the case of a lame duck, the President’s power to impose discipline recedes while factions and individuals within Congress are less willing to cooperate (281). Conciliation is unlikely except for “matters where public pressure is overwhelming, or where some other circumstance makes legislative action imperative” since the President and his party want to maintain control and the opposing party tries to take advantage of a weak President (281). In the case of Eisenhower, Democrats showed limitless disdain for the President’s domestic proposals. Rather than holding hearings about the President’s proposals, they focused on advancing their own measures and forced Eisenhower to veto many bills. Democrats forced Eisenhower to use his veto, hoping to emphasize to the public the differences among parties. While Eisenhower welcomed the opportunity to veto in attempts to “castigate the opposition as a party of reckless spendthrifts and depict his own party as safe, sane, and prudent,” the 1960 election showed that the Democrats’ strategy was successful (281).

Public approval and electoral margin are not solely independent factors for political capital, but they also help gain congressional support. Margins of victory often translate into gains for the congressional party, making them influential. Public approval can be seen as a threshold effect. As explained by Light, although “public approval cannot create vast gains in Congress, the absence of public approval eventually undercuts potentials for success” (28). As long as the President remains at a specific level of approval or better, public support may have negligible effects on congressional success. However, if the President drops below the threshold, “public opinion begins to have substantial impact in eroding legislative support” (Light 29).

Reputation’s effect on a President’s political capital is unclear. Neustadt argues it is really important, using Eisenhower has an example to show this. According to Neustadt:

Everything [the President] personally says and does (or fails to say, omits to do), becomes significant in everyone’s appraisals regardless of the claims of his officialdom. For his words, his own actions, provide clues not only to his personal proclivities but to the forecasts and asserted influence of those around him (Neustadt 68).

While Neustadt argues that reputation is important, Carter and Nixon staff assistants suggest that while mistakes may matter short-term, they usually have little effect in the long-term (Light 29). Even if the impact of reputation is disputed, it is accepted that reputation is likely to have a greater impact on capital toward the end of the first term and into the second term (Light 30). No postwar second-term President has escaped being damaged in some way by political scandal (Dunn 2006). Scandal during the President’s term is not prevalent solely because he and his staff are more likely to commit crimes and misdemeanors, but rather “the timing is attributable to the speed of the investigative process” (Dunn 2006).

Important to the discussion of political capital is whether or not it can be replenished over a term. If a President expends political capital on his agenda, can it be replaced? Light suggests that “capital declines over time – public approval consistently falls: midterm losses occur” (31). Capital can be rebuilt, but only to a limited extent. The decline of capital makes it difficult to access information, recruit more expertise and maintain energy. If a lame duck President can be defined by a loss of political capital, this paper helps determine if such capital can be replenished or if a lame duck can accomplish little. Before determining this, a definition of a lame duck President must be developed.

**Capital determines agenda above all else**

**Light 99 – Senior Fellow at the Center for Public Service (Paul, the President’s Agenda, p. 34)**

In chapter 2, I will consider just how capital affects the basic parameters of the domestic agenda. Though the internal resources are important contributors to timing and size, capital remains the cirtical factor. That conclusion will become essential in understanding the domestic agenda. Whatever the President’s personal expertise, character, or skills, capital is the most important resource. In the past, presidential scholars have focused on individual factors in discussing White House decisions, personality being the dominant factor. Yet, given low levels in presidential capital, even the most positive and most active executive could make little impact. A president can be skilled, charming, charismatic, a veritable legislative wizard, but if he does not have the basic congressional strength, his domestic agenda will be severely restricted – capital affects both the number and the content of the President’s priorities. Thus, it is capital that determines whether the President will have the opportunity to offer a detailed domestic program, whether he will be restricted to a series of limited initiatives and vetoes. Capital sets the basic parameters of the agenda, determining the size of the agenda and guiding the criteria for choice. Regardless of the President’s personality, capital is the central force behind the domestic agenda.

**Capital is key – it outweigh ideology, party support, or concessions**

**Light 99 – Senior Fellow at the Center for Public Service (Paul, the President’s Agenda, p. 24-25)**

Call it push, pull, punch, juice, power, or clout – they all mean the same thing. The most basic and most important of all presidential resources is capital. Though the internal resources time, information, expertise, and energy all have an impact on the domestic agenda, the President is severely limited without capital. And capital is directly linked to the congressional parties. While there is little question that bargaining skills can affect both the composition and the success of the domestic agenda, without the necessary party support, no amount of expertise or charm can make a difference. Though bargaining is an important tool of presidential power, it does not take place in a neutral environment. Presidents bring certain advantages and disadvantages to the table.